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Circuit Courts with Plenary Jurisdiction and 
Administrative Agencies with Exclusive 
Jurisdiction: Can They Peacefully Coexist in 
Missouri? 
Paul M. Spinden* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For Missouri courts, 2009 was the year of jurisdiction.  The year began 
with the Supreme Court of Missouri’s momentous pronouncement that the 
state’s circuit courts have broad subject matter jurisdiction – jurisdiction that 
is plenary in scope.
1
  Its breadth is so expansive that successful motions to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction seem to be a relic of the past.
2
  
As momentous as that revelation was, another at the end of the year was even 
more epochal: the circuit courts’ subject matter jurisdiction is so broad that it 
engulfs even matters that the General Assembly delegates to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of administrative agencies, such as workers’ compensation.
3
 
The reason for these revelations was a change to the Missouri Constitu-
tion – one that occurred more than three decades before.  In 1976, Missouri-
ans amended their constitution to give circuit courts “original jurisdiction 
over all cases and matters, civil and criminal.”
4
  The amendment took away 
the General Assembly’s authority to put statutory restrictions on circuit 
courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.  As significant as the amendment was, 
surprisingly there is little evidence that anyone took much notice of it before 
  
 * Spinden is associate professor at Liberty University School of Law where he 
teaches administrative law, civil procedure, contracts, and criminal law.  He served as 
judge on the Missouri Court of Appeals, 1991-2008, and was a commissioner for the 
Missouri Administrative Hearing Commission, 1986-91, and administrative law judge 
for the Missouri Department of Transportation, 1985-86.  He acknowledges with 
much gratitude the excellent assistance with this Article by his former law clerk, Ms. 
Kimberly Boeding. 
          1.  J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 253-54 (Mo. 2009)   
(en banc).  
 2. Id. at 254 (“[So long as a] case is a civil case . . . the circuit court has subject 
matter jurisdiction and, thus, has the authority to hear [the] dispute.”). 
 3. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473 (Mo. 2009)         
(en banc). 
 4. MO. CONST. art. V, § 14(a).  Before the change, the provision granted circuit 
courts “jurisdiction over all criminal cases not otherwise provided for by law,      
exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases not otherwise provided for, and con-
current and appellate jurisdiction as provided by law.”  MO. CONST. art. V, § 14 
(amended 1976).  
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the Supreme Court of Missouri shined the spotlight on it in 2009 in J.C.W. ex 
rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla.
5
  It seems odd that it took thirty-three years for Mis-
souri courts to perceive the significance of the constitution’s grant of all-
encompassing power to trial courts.  This begs two questions: what precipi-
tated the change and what was the change all about? 
When the Supreme Court finally took notice of the amendment in 
J.C.W., the court asserted that the change solved the perplexities of subject 
matter jurisdiction for Missouri judges.
6
  In fact, the court assured, the consti-
tutional amendment simplified analysis of jurisdictional issues in Missouri by 
allowing judges to determine their courts’ subject matter jurisdiction simply 
by asking whether a lawsuit is a civil case or matter.
7
  If it is, judges can be 
certain that their courts have subject matter jurisdiction, and that any issue 
arising in a case speaking in jurisdictional terms – such as a statute requiring 
posting of a bond to file a petition – is not jurisdictional.
8
  
As simple as J.C.W.’s analysis seems to be, it apparently was rather un-
settling for Missouri judges.  It was a huge change in their analysis of juris-
dictional issues, requiring them to jettison longstanding, entrenched concepts 
and traditions – and traditions tend to be tenacious.
9
  Moreover, judges, like 
most individuals, intrinsically distrust anything new.
10
  Thus Missouri judges 
struggled to apply J.C.W.’s simple approach at the outset, most notably in 
cases involving administrative agency jurisdiction.  In a case questioning the 
jurisdiction of the Missouri Division of Workers’ Compensation, an apparent-
ly exasperated appellate judge commented that, after J.C.W., “confusion . . . 
seems to permeate any use of the word ‘jurisdiction.’”
11
  
  
 5. 275 S.W.3d 249. 
 6. The complexities of jurisdictional doctrine – easy to define but difficult to 
apply – have long vexed judges.  LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 41 (4th ed. 2009).  J.C.W. estimated that Missouri judges should have 
easier go of sorting out the doctrine than federal judges because, “[i]n contrast to the 
federal system, the subject matter jurisdiction of Missouri’s courts is governed direct-
ly by the state's constitution.”  275 S.W.3d at 253. 
 7. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 254. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Traditions’ tenacious hold and individuals’ resistance to change calls to mind 
the celebrated poem by Robert Frost, “Mending Wall,” which depicts two farmers 
who devotedly repair each spring a stone fence separating their farms.  Neither farmer 
needs a fence, but one farmer, smitten by tradition, endures the arduous task in un-
thinking deference to an adage his father taught him: good fences make good neigh-
bors.  The other farmer readily recognizes that the fence is not needed but faithfully 
maintains it simply because he always has.  ROBERT FROST, Mending Wall, in NORTH 
OF BOSTON 11, 11-13 (1915). 
 10. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 27 (Peter Constantine, trans., Modern 
Library 2008) (“Men intrinsically do not trust new things that they have not experi-
enced themselves.”). 
 11. State ex rel. KCP&L Greater Mo. Operations Co. v. Cook, 353 S.W.3d 14, 
44 n.12 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (Welsh, J., dissenting). 
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Adding to judges’ confusion was the Supreme Court’s failure to lay 
down clear rules in J.C.W.  In explaining how judges should handle statutes 
that make jurisdictional-sounding requirements, J.C.W. instructed only that 
they should “read [them] as merely setting statutory limits on remedies or 
elements of claims for relief that courts may grant.”
12
  In other words, judges 
are to treat such restrictions as non-jurisdictional rules.  But J.C.W. did not 
say whether all statutory restrictions are non-jurisdictional – even those set-
ting time deadlines or those giving an administrative agency exclusive juris-
diction over a particular subject matter.  Judges trying to apply J.C.W. spent 
much time debating these matters.
13
  As former United States Supreme Court 
Justice Potter Stewart observed, “The art of being a judge, if there is such an 
art, is in announcing clear rules . . . .”
14
  
But the most notable consequence of J.C.W.’s simplified approach is its 
effect on adjudication by Missouri administrative agencies.  The General 
Assembly granted these agencies exclusive jurisdiction in special areas, such 
as on-the-job accidents, based on the perception that these subjects require 
expertise and specialized knowledge.
15
  In McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores 
East, L.P.,
16
 the court relied heavily on J.C.W. to conclude that a statute mak-
ing workers’ compensation the exclusive remedy for on-the-job accidents
17
 
was merely a non-jurisdictional statutory restriction.
18
  McCracken over-
  
 12. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 255. 
 13. Confirming Judge Welsh’s observation that, after J.C.W., Missouri’s judges 
found themselves in a quandary concerning any use of the term “jurisdiction,” see 
supra text accompanying note 11, the court in Evans v. Empire District Electric Co. 
noted the appellate court’s struggle to determine whether failure to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies is a jurisdictional issue and the dispute between the Eastern and 
Western districts concerning the matter.  346 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Mo. App. W.D. 
2011).  Moreover, the cases cited in Part III.E. infra chronicle the courts’ struggle to 
analyze time deadlines, previously deemed jurisdictional issues, according to the 
J.C.W. analytical paradigm. 
 14. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Devel-
opment and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1365, 1393 (1983).  A couple of years before J.C.W., a law student comment-
ing on a confusing line of Missouri cases used Justice Stewart’s observation to ad-
monish the court of its need to articulate clear rules.  Alison K. Spinden, Slurred 
Speech and Double Vision: Missouri’s Supreme Court is Unsteady on DWI Standard, 
72 MO. L. REV. 1411, 1411 (2007).  The Supreme Court of Missouri acknowledged 
the need to resolve the confusion in White v. Director of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 
307 n.8 (Mo. 2011) (en banc). 
 15. See generally Killian v. J & J Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Mo. 
1991) (en banc) (“[C]ourts will not decide a controversy involving a question within 
the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal until after that tribunal has rendered its 
decision: (1) where administrative knowledge and expertise are demanded . . . .”).  
 16. 298 S.W.3d 473 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).  
 17. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120 (Supp. 2012). 
 18. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 475. 
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turned a long line of cases holding that the Division of Workers’ Compensa-
tion has jurisdiction exclusive of the circuit courts to determine workers’ 
compensation cases.
19
  The court said those cases “confused the concept of a 
circuit court’s jurisdiction . . . with the separate issue of the circuit court’s 
statutory or common law authority to grant relief in a particular case.”
20
  It 
decided that the division’s exclusive jurisdiction over workplace accidents 
was not jurisdictional at all, but was merely a waivable affirmative defense.
21
  
McCracken portends significant modifications to how the state courts 
perceive the interrelation between Missouri administrative agency adjudica-
tions and circuit courts’ jurisdictional power.  The courts’ treatment of exclu-
sive administrative remedies as non-jurisdictional issues has the potential to 
undermine administrative agencies’ effectiveness in addressing society’s 
manifold problems.
22
  McCracken compels trial judges to proceed with adju-
dicating workers’ compensation cases masquerading as tort actions – even 
when the facts clearly demonstrate that the claims arose out of an on-the-job 
accident – unless the parties assert workers’ compensation as an affirmative 
defense, and only then if they properly assert it.
23
  One of the key conse-
quences of McCracken is that the judiciary’s enforcement of an exclusive 
administrative remedy depends entirely on the parties’ requesting it.
24
 
Moreover, the decision’s analysis raises the highly undesirable prospect 
of unwieldy dual lines of cases: one adjudicated by administrative agencies, 
and another potentially conflicting line adjudicated in the circuit courts.  Not 
only does the likelihood of unacceptable forum shopping emerge, but the 
court’s decision also threatens to undercut administrative agencies’ policies 
and ability to deal with the problems that motivated the General Assembly to 
establish them in the first place.
25
  
McCracken’s conclusions seem to rest on a faulty and weak foundation.  
In deducing that workers’ compensation exclusivity is a non-jurisdictional 
affirmative defense,
26
 the court misperceived workers’ compensation prece-
dent.  The primary reason for rethinking McCracken’s analysis is that the 
  
 19. Id. at 474. 
 20. Id. at 477.  
 21. Id. 
 22. As the Supreme Court of Missouri has recognized, applying expertise in 
finding solutions to society’s problems is the raison d’être for the state’s administra-
tive agencies.  Killian v. J & J Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Mo. 1991) (en 
banc).  Robert Glicksman and Richard Levy have observed that “administrative agen-
cies have proliferated because they are an efficient and effective means of implement-
ing important public policies.”  ROBERT GLICKSMAN & RICHARD LEVY, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY ACTION IN LEGAL CONTEXT 21 (2010). 
 23. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 477.  
 24. See id. 
 25. State ex rel. KCP&L Greater Mo. Operations Co. v. Cook, 353 S.W.3d 14, 
51 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (Smart, J., dissenting). 
 26. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 477. 
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court apparently failed to appreciate that the circuit courts’ jurisdiction is not 
an all-or-nothing matter.  Recognition of workers’ compensation as an exclu-
sive remedy is not mutually exclusive to the circuit courts’ plenary subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Sound analysis was available to the McCracken court that 
would have permitted exclusive agency remedies and plenary circuit court 
jurisdiction to peacefully coexist.
27
 
Because the centerpiece of both J.C.W.’s and McCracken’s analyses was 
the wording of Missouri’s constitutional provision granting jurisdiction to the 
circuit courts, Part II examines this provision, including its impetus.  Part III 
considers J.C.W.’s exposition of jurisdiction and focuses on its contention 
that the Missouri Constitution necessarily excludes statutory restrictions on 
the judiciary’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction.  Part IV closely exam-
ines McCracken’s application of J.C.W.’s analysis to the issue of exclusive 
administrative remedies and agency jurisdiction.  Finally, Part V suggests 
alternative analyses that maintain exclusive remedies for workers’ compensa-
tion and other administrative agencies while preserving the circuit courts’ 
plenary subject matter jurisdiction.  
II.  THE CONSTITUTION’S BROAD GRANT OF  
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
A.  Significance of the Scope of the Circuit Courts’ 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
In J.C.W., the Supreme Court held that a statute prohibiting a circuit 
court from considering a child custody dispute because one of the parties had 
not posted a bond was not jurisdictional.
28
  The court held that the Missouri 
Constitution forbids the statute from affecting the court’s subject matter juris-
diction over the lawsuit.
29
  Instead, the statutory restriction must be treated as 
a non-jurisdictional issue.  If an issue does not involve jurisdiction, it neces-
sarily must be a non-jurisdictional matter – either a matter of procedure, or of 
the substantive merits on which a lawsuit will be determined.
30
  
  
 27. Four alternatives to the McCracken court’s analysis – each of which would 
permit exclusive agency remedies and plenary circuit court jurisdiction to coexist – 
are set out in Part V infra.  These alternatives include (1) properly distinguishing 
between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional facts; (2) interpreting the Missouri Con-
stitution’s grant of plenary jurisdiction to circuit courts to not include administrative 
adjudications; (3) deeming exclusive administrative remedies that masquerade as tort 
actions to be non-justiciable; and (4) reinstating the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in 
Missouri’s jurisprudence. 
 28. 275 S.W.3d 249, 254 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 29. Id. at 255. 
 30. Id. at 254.  The court read the requisite bond to put a limit “on remedies or 
elements of claims for relief that courts may grant.”  Id. at 255. 
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The court’s analysis rested almost entirely on its interpretation of Article 
V, section 14(a) of the Missouri Constitution, which states, “The circuit 
courts shall have original jurisdiction over all cases and matters, civil and 
criminal.”
31
  The J.C.W. Court emphasized the provision’s “plenary terms”
32
 
and apparently interpreted its reference to “all cases and matters” as encom-
passing the universe of civil and criminal cases.
33
  By giving the circuit court 
authority to hear any civil or criminal case, the J.C.W. court reasoned, the 
constitution necessarily prohibits any restriction that would decrease the cir-
cuit court’s jurisdictional power and render it less than all-encompassing.
34
  
The statutory restriction at issue in J.C.W. prohibited the circuit court 
from considering a petition for modification of a child custody decree under 
certain conditions, including a petitioner’s failure to post of a bond.
35
  On the 
grounds that the Missouri Constitution forbade treating the statute as jurisdic-
tional, the J.C.W. court concluded that the circuit court could heed the statute 
only by deeming it non-jurisdictional.
36
  “When a statute speaks in jurisdic-
tional terms or can be read in such terms,” the court instructed, “it is proper to 
read it as merely setting statutory limits on remedies or elements of claims for 
relief that courts may grant.”
37
  In other words, the court’s position is that, 
because the circuit courts’ subject matter jurisdiction is plenary, the only im-
pediments that the General Assembly can impose on the circuit courts’ exer-
cise of subject matter jurisdiction are non-jurisdictional rules concerning pro-
cedure and substantive merits of a cause of action.  
The issue is quite crucial in its effect on the adjudicative process.  If a 
rule is jurisdictional, the circuit court is duty-bound to enforce it, even if it 
must do so sua sponte,
38
 but if a rule is non-jurisdictional, the circuit court 
cannot enforce it unless a party requests enforcement of the rule and does so 
in a proper manner.
39
  This renders the non-jurisdictional rule merely a matter 
  
 31. MO. CONST. art. V, § 14(a) (1945, as amended 1976).  
 32. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 253.  
 33. The court never says that it believes section 14(a)’s reference to “all cases 
and matters” is all-encompassing, but see infra Part III.C for discussion of why this 
inference seems to be valid. 
 34. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 253-54. 
 35. The statute said: 
When a person filing a petition for modification of a child custody decree 
owes past due child support to a custodial parent in an amount in excess of ten 
thousand dollars, such person shall post a bond in the amount of past due child 
support owed as ascertained by the division of child support enforcement or 
reasonable legal fees of the custodial parent, whichever is greater, before the 
filing of the petition.  
MO. REV. STAT. § 452.455.4 (2000), repealed by H.B. 481, 95
th
 Gen. Assemb., 1
st
 
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009). 
 36. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 255. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. at 254. 
 39. See id. at 257-58. 
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of the parties’ trial strategy.  Moreover, as J.C.W. emphasized, courts tend to 
enforce jurisdictional rules much more strictly and zealously than they do 
non-jurisdictional procedural rules.
40
  Judges tend to heed jurisdictional rules 
“rigidly, literally, and mercilessly,”
41
 partly because they understand that 
acting without jurisdiction can render their judgments a nullity.  Mistaken 
application of a non-jurisdictional rule will, at worst, constitute reversible 
error, and the mistake will typically go unaddressed unless a party preserves 
the error for appeal by raising it at the proper time.  Furthermore, unlike ju-
risdictional rules, non-jurisdictional issues rarely constitute a basis for a col-
lateral attack of the court’s judgment.  
The court in McCracken read J.C.W.’s point concerning statutory re-
strictions as applying to statutes that mandate exclusive administrative reme-
dies, such as workers’ compensation.
42
  This understanding of J.C.W. has 
significant ramifications for the operation of administrative agencies in Mis-
souri.  These agencies derive virtually all of their authority from statutes; 
therefore, treating statutes that delegate jurisdiction to administrative agencies 
as mere non-jurisdictional rules can substantially thwart the General Assem-
bly’s ability to establish agencies with exclusive, unshared authority.  Thus, 
because J.C.W.’s analysis hinged entirely on its interpretation of Article V, 
section 14(a), tracing that provision’s history is beneficial for a complete 
understanding of the interrelation between circuit courts’ subject matter juris-
diction and administrative agencies’ exclusive jurisdiction.  
B.  Reason for the Constitution’s Broad Grant of  
Jurisdictional Power to the Circuit Courts 
The present wording of Article V, section 14(a) emerged in 1976 after 
much of Missouri’s bureaucracy had functioned for decades.
43
  Before then, 
section 14 expressly provided authority for the legislature to establish admin-
istrative agencies and to grant those agencies exclusive jurisdiction.  The 
former section 14 declared that the state circuit courts had original jurisdic-
tion “over all criminal cases not otherwise provided for by law, exclusive 
original jurisdiction in all civil cases not otherwise provided for, and concur-
rent and appellate jurisdiction as provided by law.”
44
  Section 14 thus made 
  
 40. Id. at 251 (“[Jurisdiction] has magic because it can make judgments disap-
pear, as in: ‘The judgment is a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction.’”). 
 41. Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1, 5 (1994). 
 42. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 479 (Mo. 2009) 
(en banc). 
 43. Workers’ compensation, for example, began functioning in 1927, and the 
Public Service Commission came into existence in 1913.  Bethel v. Sunlight Janitor 
Serv., 551 S.W.2d 616, 618 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); About the PSC, MO. PUB. SERV. 
COMM’N., http://psc.mo.gov/General/About_The_PSC (last visited Aug. 20, 2013).  
 44. MO. CONST. art. V, § 14 (amended in 1976) (emphasis added). 
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the circuit courts’ original jurisdiction subject to other provisions of law, in-
cluding the General Assembly’s statutes.   
The impetus for amending section 14 was the reorganization of the 
state’s multi-tiered system of trial courts.  Before the reorganization, the trial 
courts consisted of a confusing array of independent courts, some of which 
were unique to a particular location.
45
  Circuit courts operated alongside sepa-
rate probate and magistrate courts and an odd mixture of courts with unique, 
independent jurisdictions, typically established by statute, in locales such as 
St. Louis and Hannibal.
46
  Each acted independently of, and at times in con-
flict with, each other.
47
  
Appearing on the August 1976 primary election ballot,
48
 Missouri voters 
narrowly approved
49
 a twenty-six page proposal that completely overhauled 
the court system.  It merged all but the municipal courts into a single, unitary 
circuit court system.
50
  This reorganization required repeal of statutes setting 
the previous courts’ jurisdictions, but drafters of the reform measures feared 
that they would not be able to find all of the statutes needing to be repealed.
51
  
The drafters’ apprehension caused them to propose deleting section 14’s ref-
  
 45. Carter Stith, Amendment No. 6 Would Abolish Complex Court System in St. 
Louis, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPTACH, July 19, 1976, at 3B. 
 46. Id.  An example of one of the courts with unique jurisdiction was the Court 
of Criminal Corrections in St. Louis.  Id.  This court was established in 1866 “for 
reasons no one seems to recall, but possibly to give city politicians an extra wedge of 
patronage to spread; or possibly to remove minor criminal matters from the hands of 
justices of the peace.”  Id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Officials put the measure on the primary election ballot in August rather than 
on the general election ballot in November to ward off an initiative petition calling for 
a different set of reform measures being circulated by a citizens’ group.  Ted Gest, 
Judicial Amendment Is Compromise, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 20, 1976, at 3B.  
The group’s aim was to get their countermeasures on the November general election 
ballot.  Id.  Gov. Christopher Bond preempted their effort by putting the General 
Assembly’s proposal, backed by the Supreme Court and the Missouri Bar leadership, 
on the August primary election ballot.  Id.  
 49. Only 51.6 percent of the slightly more than one million votes cast favored 
reform.  Primary Election Returns: Vote on Proposed Constitutional Amendments 
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 at Special Election Tuesday, August 3, 1976, in 1977-1978 
OFFICIAL MANUAL OF STATE OF MISSOURI 1255, 1257 (Kenneth M. Johnson, ed. 
1979).  The vote count was 518,521 in favor and 485,536 opposed.  Id.  
 50. Richard J. Hardy & Joseph J. Carrier, Missouri Courts, Judges, and Juries, in 
MISSOURI GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 173, 174-75 (Richard J. Hardy et al. eds., 
Univ. of Missouri Press rev. & enlarged ed. 1995); see also Charles B. Blackmar, 
Missouri’s Nonpartisan Court Plan from 1942 to 2005, 72 MO. L. REV. 199, 207-08 
(2007). 
 51. Interview with Alex Bartlett, Attorney (January 20, 2012) [hereinafter Bart-
lett Interview].  The Missouri Bar retained Bartlett, a Jefferson City attorney, to aid 
with the Missouri Bar’s push for court reform.  Id. 
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erence to other provisions of law, with the effect of granting the reorganized 
circuit courts plenary jurisdiction.
52
 
The drafters did not propose the deletion because they perceived a need 
for plenary jurisdiction or other change in policy; it was strictly a matter of 
pragmatics.
53
  They proposed the deletion only out of concern for protecting 
the reform effort, which was not without its opponents,
54
 from an attack 
against the newly-formed courts’ jurisdiction.
55
  Drafters feared that a suc-
cessful attack on the courts’ jurisdiction could arise from some obscure stat-
ute originally attached to one of the previously independent courts that had 
not been repealed.
56
  
To reformers, the deletion seemed the simplest, most straightforward so-
lution.
57
  Having been rebuffed for more than a decade by the General As-
sembly, reformers feared losing the opportunity presented by the legislature’s 
sudden change of heart, which came under the threat of reformers taking the 
matter directly to voters.
58
  A constitutional grant of plenary power would 
overcome any forgotten statute that might be dragged from the recesses of the 
statute books.
59
  
A key point in section 14(a)’s history is that the drafters did not intend 
for the judiciary’s broadened jurisdiction to affect or alter operation of        
the Division of Workers’ Compensation or any other state administrative 
agency.
60
  Indeed, as the drafters strategized and deliberated, they never gave 
any thought to administrative agencies or their jurisdiction.
61
  Unanticipated 
consequences are a hazard of any reform effort,
62
 certainly when the refor-
mation is of the magnitude of Missouri’s court reorganization.  Nonetheless, 
  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Although opposition to the reform was low key and not organized, a few 
opponents, including a citizens group that had pushed for more extensive reform 
measures, spoke out against the proposal.  Gest, supra note 48.  What criticism that 
was voiced tended to be overshadowed by one of six other proposed constitutional 
amendments appearing on the ballot, a proposal to modify the strict ban of Missouri’s 
constitution on state assistance to church-related schools.  Dana L. Spitzer, Nonpublic 
School Aid A Hot Issue for August, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 20, 1976, at 1B. 
 55. Bartlett Interview, supra note 51. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. The General Assembly had begrudgingly relented to repeated calls for 
reorganizing Missouri’s confusing court system only when the Missouri Bar and an 
independent citizens group initiated separate petition drives that would have bypassed 
the legislature by taking the issue directly to voters.  Judicial Reform Vote is Tuesday, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 1, 1976, at 2J. 
 59. Bartlett Interview, supra note 51. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Machiavelli, supra note 10, at 27 (“Nothing is harder to do, more dubious to 
succeed at, or more dangerous to manage than . . . introducing a new order.”). 
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the court reorganization and the amendment of section 14 undoubtedly had a 
negative effect on administrative agencies’ jurisdictional authority as per-
ceived by the Supreme Court of Missouri in McCracken.  
C.  Initial Perceptions of the Amendment’s Effect on  
Administrative Agencies’ Jurisdictional Authority 
After the amendment of section 14 became effective on September 2, 
1976,
63
 administrative agencies continued to function as they always had, and 
the courts continued to enforce exclusive administrative remedies as a matter 
of jurisdiction.
64
  Not until 1991, in Goodrum v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 
did Missouri’s appellate courts consider a contention that the amendment of 
section 14 affected an administrative agency’s exclusive authority to adjudi-
cate subject matter assigned to it by the General Assembly.
65
  One of the 
questions in Goodrum was whether the amended section 14 granted circuit 
courts concurrent jurisdiction with the Division of Workers’ Compensation.
66
  
The plaintiffs asserted that, because the circuit courts could hear all civil cas-
es and matters, claimants had a choice of filing their action with the division 
or in the civil courts.
67
 
The plaintiffs in Goodrum were the parents of a man who died from in-
gesting a substance – apparently a narcotic – given to him by his work fore-
man during work hours.
68
  The parents sought to avoid a workers’ compensa-
tion remedy in favor of pursuing a tort remedy against the decedent’s em-
ployer.
69
  They sued their son’s former employer and foreman for negligence 
  
 63. 1975-76 MO. LAWS 819-34. 
 64. See, e.g., State ex rel. MW Builders, Inc. v. Midkiff, 222 S.W.3d 267, 268 
(Mo. 2007) (en banc); State ex rel. Tri-Cnty. Elec. Coop. Ass’n v. Dial, 192 S.W.3d 
708, 712 (Mo. 2006) (en banc); Goodrum v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 824 S.W.2d 
6, 7 (Mo. 1992); Killian v. J & J Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Mo. 1991) (en 
banc); State ex rel. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Ryan, 745 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Mo. 
1988) (en banc), overruled by McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 
473 (Mo. 2009) (en banc); Jones v. Jay Truck Driver Training Ctr., Inc., 709 S.W.2d 
114, 115 (Mo. 1986) (en banc), overruled by McCracken, 298 S.W.3d 473; State ex 
rel. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Luten, 679 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Mo. 1984) (en banc). 
 65. Goodrum, 824 S.W.2d at 12.  Because the court handed down its decision on 
January 28, 1992, an assumption that the appellate courts began considering it during 
1991 seems fairly safe. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 11-12.  The plaintiffs asserted several other constitutional attacks be-
fore arguing that section 14 granted the circuit court concurrent jurisdiction over the 
lawsuit.  Id. at 7.  That the plaintiffs did not put a lot of stock in this argument seems 
to be a safe assumption. 
 68. Id.  The court described the substance as “white cross” and reported that it 
apparently caused the decedent to suffer sun-stroke, cardio-respiratory arrest, and 
acute renal failure.  Id.  He died twenty days after reacting to the substance.  Id. 
 69. See id. 
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and intentional tort.
70
  The circuit court sustained the employer’s motion to 
dismiss on grounds that, because the matter implicated workers’ compensa-
tion statutes, the division had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter,          
including the power to determine whether the decedent’s injuries resulted 
from an   accident or intentional conduct.
71
  The Goodrum court agreed that 
the division had “exclusive jurisdiction” to determine the issue and the circuit 
court properly dismissed the case.
72
  In rejecting the contention that the cir-
cuit court had concurrent jurisdiction, the court explained that “Article V, the 
Judicial Article, is devoted to governing the courts and judges, and we do not 
read the [1976] amendment [to section 14] as a constraint upon the previously 
established power of the administrative agencies.”
73
  Thus, the court properly 
understood the amendment.  It did not affect the division’s exclusive jurisdic-
tion over workers’ compensation cases, and it did not extend the circuit 
courts’ jurisdiction beyond traditional civil actions to include administrative 
adjudicative cases.
74
  The amendment simply did not accord circuit courts 
concurrent jurisdiction with administrative agencies.
75
 
Missouri appellate courts did not again consider a challenge to the ex-
clusivity of the workers’ compensation remedy until McCracken.
76
  For sev-
enteen years, Missouri courts persisted in treating exclusive administrative 
remedies as jurisdictional rules.
77
  After the 1976 constitutional amendment 
and Goodrum, little changed in the way Missouri courts analyzed workers’ 
compensation statutes or any other statutes according an exclusive adminis-
trative remedy.
78
  Until 2009, when the J.C.W. court imparted its lesson on 
jurisdiction, Missouri’s courts continued to assume that the Division of 
  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 8.  
 73. Id. at 12.  
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 478 (Mo. 2009) 
(en banc) (finding only pre-1992 cases considering jurisdiction of the workers’ com-
pensation defense).  
 77. As late as 2009, Missouri’s appellate courts still deemed a circuit court to 
lack subject matter jurisdiction if a petitioner’s claim fell within the provisions of 
workers’ compensation statutes.  See, e.g., Olendorff v. St. Luke’s Episcopal-
Presbyterian Hosps., 293 S.W.3d 47, 49 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009) (“A motion to dismiss 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a proper means of raising the workers’ com-
pensation law as a defense to a common law tort action.”); Battles v. United Fire       
& Cas. Co., 295 S.W.3d 486, 487 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009) (mem.) (affirmed          
circuit court’s dismissal of lawsuit “for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because 
plaintiff’s exclusive remedy for her alleged injuries falls under the workers’         
compensation law”). 
 78. See Joseph H. Guffey & Nathan D. Sturycz, Asserting the Workers’ Compen-
sation Exclusive Remedy Bar After McCracken, 66 J. MO. BAR 206, 206 (2010). 
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Workers’ Compensation had exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate any workers’ 
compensation claim to the exclusion of the circuit courts.
79
  
III.  J.C.W.’S  FUNDAMENTAL LESSON IN JURISDICTION 
J.C.W. was a domestic relations case involving issues of child custody 
and child support.
80
  At the center of the controversy was a statute
81
 imposing 
conditions on the circuit court’s authority to consider the petitioner’s claim.
82
  
The appellate courts considering the statute deemed it to be a jurisdictional 
bar to the circuit court adjudicating the matter; however, they could not agree 
on how to characterize the jurisdictional issue.
83
  The appellate judges charac-
terized the issue variously as a matter of personal jurisdiction,
84
 subject    
matter jurisdiction, and jurisdictional competency.
85
  In J.C.W., the Supreme 
Court of Missouri declared that all three characterizations were wrong;       
the statute did not raise a jurisdictional issue at all.
86
  The court explained that 
the statute was a non-jurisdictional rule that pertained to matters of proce-
dure.
87
  In light of the appellate courts’ mischaracterization of the statute,    
the Supreme Court perceived a need in J.C.W. to give a fundamental lesson  
in jurisdiction. 
Subpart A recounts the issues in dispute in J.C.W. that motivated the 
court’s lesson in jurisdiction.  Subpart B focuses on the first point of the 
court’s lesson: rejection of the concept of jurisdictional competence and 
recognition of only two forms of jurisdiction – personal and subject matter.  
In tracing the history of Missouri courts’ recognition of jurisdictional compe-
tency prior to J.C.W., subpart B confirms the court’s conclusion that jurisdic-
tional competency was merely a form of subject matter jurisdiction.  Subpart 
C considers the second and cornerstone point of the court’s lesson: that the 
subject matter jurisdiction of Missouri’s circuit courts is plenary in scope.  
This point opened the door to the McCracken court’s conclusion that the cir-
cuit courts have subject matter jurisdiction in all cases, even those in which 
  
 79. See id. at 206-07. 
 80. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 256 (Mo. 2009)         
(en banc). 
 81. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.455.4 (2000), repealed by H.B. 481, 95
th
 Gen. 
Assemb., 1
st
 Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009).  This statute is set out in full supra note 35. 
 82. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 252. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See Miller v. Miller, 210 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007), abrogated 
by J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d 249.  
 85. In considering J.C.W. before its transfer to the Supreme Court of Missouri, 
the Eastern District Court of Appeals deemed the statute to raise either an issue of 
subject matter jurisdiction or “jurisdictional competence.”  J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d         
at 252. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 255. 
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the General Assembly has granted exclusive jurisdiction to an administrative 
agency.  Subpart D addresses the court’s failure in J.C.W. to make an all-
important distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional fact-
finding, and subpart E shows how this failure has caused confusion among 
judges trying to apply J.C.W.’s lesson.  
A.  The Dispute in J.C.W. 
In J.C.W., Kelly Webb petitioned the circuit court for approval to move 
with her two children from Missouri to California.
88
  She summoned the chil-
dren’s father, Jason Wyciskalla, who responded by filing a motion asking the 
circuit court, inter alia, to alter the child custody arrangement and his child 
support obligations.
89
  After a hearing, the circuit court denied Webb’s re-
quest to relocate, granted Wyciskalla’s motion for modification of the custo-
dy arrangement, and declared that Wyciskalla had no child support obliga-
tions.
90
  On appeal, a central issue was whether the circuit court could enter 
its order in light of Missouri Revised Statutes section 452.455.4.
91
  This stat-
ute requires parties seeking a change in child custody to post a bond if they 
are more than $10,000 in arrears in their child payments.
92
  The J.C.W. court 
acknowledged that the statute’s “plain language” prohibited Wyciskalla from 
filing his motion to alter child custody.
93
  
Before resolving the issue of the General Assembly’s power to prohibit 
the filing of a petition, the court seized upon the opportunity to lay down a 
six-paragraph, three-point lesson on the basics of jurisdiction.
94
  First, it de-
clared that Missouri courts recognize only two kinds of jurisdiction – not 
three, as the J.C.W. court believed its intermediate appellate judges to be sug-
gesting.
95
  According to the court, the only types of jurisdiction cognizable by 
Missouri courts are personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.
96
  
J.C.W. thus sounded the death knell for the concept of jurisdictional compe-
tency, long understood by Missouri courts as an essential element of jurisdic-
tion.
97
  Second, J.C.W. interpreted the Missouri Constitution as granting ple-
nary subject matter jurisdiction to the circuit courts and declared that such 
jurisdiction includes not only the circuit courts’ authority to adjudicate a cat-
egory of cases (civil cases and matters and criminal cases and matters) but 
  
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 256.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 252.  Section 452.455.4 is set out supra note 35. 
 92. § 452.455.4; see also J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 252. 
 93. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 256. 
 94. Id. at 252-54. 
 95. Id. at 252.  
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 254. 
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also any issue affecting adjudication of a particular case.
98
  Third, it conclud-
ed that, in light of the circuit courts’ plenary jurisdiction, any statute imposing 
conditions on a circuit court’s authority to adjudicate a case must be treated 
as a waivable, non-jurisdictional rule.
99
 
B.  Missouri Courts Recognize Only Two Kinds of Jurisdiction 
Concerning the first point of J.C.W.’s jurisdiction lesson was that   
“Missouri courts recognize only two kinds of jurisdiction: subject matter  
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction,”
100
 it is debatable whether Missouri 
courts ever recognized more than two kinds of jurisdiction.  For more than     
a century before J.C.W.,
101
 Missouri was among a number of states that di-
vided jurisdiction into three elements – or “essentials.”
102
  Missouri courts  
did not begin dubbing the third essential as “jurisdictional competency” –      
a term apparently unique to Missouri in this use – until around 1941,
103
 but 
Missouri courts did not view the concept as a separate category of jurisdic-
tion.  Rather, they deemed it to be an element of a court’s overall jurisdiction-
al authority along with jurisdiction’s other two elements: the subject of the 
lawsuit (subject matter jurisdiction) and the court’s authority over the parties 
(personal jurisdiction).
104
  
  
 98. Id. at 253-54. 
 99. See id. at 254-55. 
 100. Id. at 252. 
 101. See infra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.  
 102. Although labeled various ways – in many cases only as “the third element of 
jurisdiction” – a concept identical to Missouri’s jurisdictional competency has been 
recognized in sixteen other states.  Lewis v. Palmer, 67 Ariz. 189, 195, 193 P.2d 456, 
459-460 (1948); Morgan v. Hartford Hosp., 301 Conn. 388, 401, 21 A.3d 451, 459 
(2011); Arcadia Citrus Growers Ass’n. v. Hollingsworth, 135 Fla. 322, 326, 185 So. 
431, 433 (1938); People v. Moran, 977 N.E.2d 801, 806 (Ill. Ct. App. 2012); City of 
Gary v. Major, 822 N.E.2d 165, 170 (Ind. 2005); Moeller v. Moeller, 175 Kan. 848, 
858, 267 P.2d 536, 543 (1954); Newell Enters., Inc. v. Bowling, 158 S.W.3d 750, 757 
(Ky. 2005); Fries v. Carpenter, 567 A.2d 437, 439 (Me. 1989); People v. Redman, 
250 Mich. 334, 340, 230 N.W. 196, 198 (1930) (Potter, J. dissenting); Peisker v. 
Chavez, 46 N.M. 159, 123 P.2d 726,728-729 (1942); Ashikian v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. 
Horse Racing Comm’n,, 2008 OK 64, 188 P.3d 148, 154 (2008); Payne v. Com. Dept. 
of Corr., 813 A.2d 918, 935 (Pa. 2002); Isham v. Sienknecht, 59 S.W. 779, 784 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1900); Alvarado v. Okla. Sur. Co., 281 S.W.3d 38, 41 (Tex. App. 
2005); Drewry v. Doyle, 179 Va. 715, 720, 20 S.E.2d 548, 551 (1942); State v. 
Barnes, 146 Wn. 2d 74, 85, 43 P.3d 490, 496 (2002) (en banc). 
 103. The first case found to attach the “competency” label to the concept was 
State ex rel. Lambert v. Flynn, 154 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. 1941) (en banc). 
 104. See generally Scott Stephens, Florida’s Third Species of Jurisdiction, 82 
FLA. B. J. 11 (2008) (proposing that jurisdiction is a “legal conclusion” that is depend-
ent on the presence of three elements).  As described in this Article, Florida courts 
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J.C.W. was correct, however, that what Missouri courts called jurisdic-
tional competency actually was what most courts consider to be a component 
of subject matter jurisdiction.  Indeed, a hornbook definition of subject matter 
jurisdiction is that it is “the competency of a court to hear and decide particu-
lar categories of cases.”
105
  J.C.W. decided that continued recognition of  
jurisdictional competency had sufficient “potential ill effects”
106
 that,    
henceforth, Missouri judges must “confine their discussions of circuit      
court jurisdiction to constitutionally recognized doctrines of personal         
and subject matter jurisdiction . . . .”
107
  With that, jurisdictional competency 
died unceremoniously.  
1.  History of the Concept of Jurisdictional Competency 
The history of jurisdictional competency in Missouri makes clear that 
Missouri courts had not treated the concept as a separate category of jurisdic-
tion, as the J.C.W. court suggested.  Instead, courts perceived the concept to 
be a matter of proper pleading – that a court did not have jurisdiction unless a 
party had pleaded a cause of action for which the court could grant relief. 
The concept of jurisdictional competency originated in Missouri in 1891 
with Hope v. Blair.
108
  In that case, the Supreme Court of Missouri relied on a 
New Jersey Supreme Court decision
109
 in concluding that jurisdiction has 
“three essentials”: “First, the court must have cognizance of the class of cases 
to which the one adjudged belongs; second, the proper parties must be pre-
sent; and, third, the point decided must be, in substance and effect, within the 
issue.”
110
  The point of the third element, as explained by the Hope court, was 
that a court did not have jurisdiction to consider a claim that was not included 
in the pleadings: 
A court may be said to have jurisdiction of the subject-matter of a suit 
when it has the right to proceed to determine the controversy or ques-
tion in issue between the parties, or grant the relief prayed.  What the 
controversy or issue, in any case is, can only be determined from the 
pleadings.
111
 
  
label the concept as “procedural jurisdiction.”  Id. at 11.  It is virtually identical to 
Missouri’s jurisdictional competency.  See Flynn, 154 S.W.2d at 57.  
 105. TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 6, at 41  (emphasis of “competency” added). 
 106. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 254 (Mo. 2009)         
(en banc). 
 107. Id. 
 108. 16 S.W. 595 (Mo. 1891). 
 109. Munday v. Vail, 34 N.J.L. 418 (N.J. 1871). 
 110. Hope, 16 S.W. at 597 (quoting Munday, 34 N.J.L. at 422) (internal quota-
tions marks omitted). 
 111. Id. 
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When the Supreme Court revisited the issue of jurisdictional competency 
three years later in Charles v. White, it noted that the concept had gained wide 
acceptance.
112
  The court, however, made a confusing observation: “[W]e 
think that the trend of the courts of this country is to enlarge the definition of 
jurisdiction with the statement that it should, properly defined, include not 
only the power to hear and determine, but power to render the particular 
judgment in the particular case.”
113
  As a close study of Hope and White re-
veals, jurisdictional competence did not broaden jurisdiction’s definition.  
Instead, it referred only to circumstances in which “the court proceeds beyond 
the allegations of the pleadings and the prayer for relief and decrees a matter 
between parties defendant . . . .”
114
 
When the Supreme Court of Missouri took up the matter of jurisdiction-
al competency again three decades later in State ex rel. Lambert v. Flynn, the 
court still deemed the concept to refer to a jurisdictional requirement that a 
petitioner’s pleading state a cause of action.
115
  The facts in Flynn were simi-
lar to those in J.C.W.  A former police officer seeking disability retirement 
benefits sued the St. Louis Board of Trustees of the Police Retirement Pen-
sion System.
116
  The board contested the circuit court’s jurisdiction on the 
ground that the petition did not plead that petitioner complied with statutory 
requirements that he submit his claim to the board before filing his civil ac-
tion.
117
  The Supreme Court previously held that the statutory requirements 
were jurisdictional.
118
  The Flynn court concluded that the petition “did not 
state a cause of action over which respondent could exercise jurisdiction.”
119
  
In response to the argument that the board waived jurisdiction by appearing in 
court and filing an answer, the Flynn court said: 
[The argument assumes] that the circuit court had jurisdiction of the 
subject matter, and that the question was as to jurisdiction over the 
person.  Such is not the fact.  It is said that the jurisdiction of a court to 
adjudicate a controversy rests on three essentials: (1) jurisdiction of 
subject matter; (2) jurisdiction of the res or the parties; (3) and juris-
diction to render the particular judgment in the particular case.  The 
first two are the grand subdivisions of jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction of the 
subject matter is derived from the law and cannot be conferred by con-
  
 112. Charles v. White, 112 S.W. 545, 549 (Mo. 1908) (citing court decisions in 
Indiana, Colorado, Minnesota, and West Virginia as accepting the view). 
 113. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 114. Id. 
 115. 154 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Mo. 1941). 
 116. Id. at 54. 
 117. Id. at 55. 
 118. See State ex rel. Lambert v. Padberg, 145 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Mo. 1940) (en 
banc) (holding that whether a circuit court obtains jurisdiction is dependent on the law 
at the time the action was filed). 
 119. Flynn, 154 S.W.2d at 56. 
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sent.  Jurisdiction over the person may be waived because it is a per-
sonal privilege.   
But the third essential, jurisdiction to render the particular judgment in 
the particular case, (sometimes called ‘competency’), partakes of the 
character of one or the other of the first two.  Where the lacking ele-
ment of jurisdiction goes to the personal privilege of the litigant, it 
may be waived.  It is said in 21 C.J.S. [sec. 84]: “If the court cannot 
try the question except under particular conditions or when ap-
proached in a particular way, the law withholds jurisdiction unless 
such conditions exist or unless the court is approached in the manner 
provided, and consent will not avail to change the provision of the law 
in this regard.”  In the instant case [the circuit] court had no power to 
try the case until statutory conditions had been complied with and ad-
ministrative remedies had been exhausted, and also unless these facts 
were shown by the petition upon which respondent’s jurisdiction was 
invoked.  It partook of jurisdiction of the subject matter and could not 
be waived by mere appearance of the [board].
120
 
The Flynn court, thus, did not view jurisdictional competency as a third cate-
gory of jurisdiction, but as an “essential” to the exercise of jurisdiction.
121
  
Like Hope and Charles, Flynn tied jurisdictional competency to the plaintiff’s 
or petitioner’s filing a cause of action for which relief could be granted.
122
  
Because the petitioner in Flynn failed to state a proper cause of action, Mis-
souri’s supreme court concluded that the circuit court did not have competen-
cy to exercise its power over the lawsuit.
123
 
As J.C.W. noted, Flynn did not question the circuit court’s subject mat-
ter jurisdiction;
124
 rather, Flynn readily acknowledged that the circuit court 
had general authority to adjudicate the subject matter.
125
  Flynn’s holding was 
that the petitioner’s failure to plead a cause of action for which relief could be 
granted rendered the circuit court incompetent to exercise its jurisdictional 
authority.
126
  Rather than resulting from confusion concerning jurisdiction, as 
J.C.W. surmised,
127
 the Flynn court’s analysis hinged on a statutory requisite, 
  
 120. Id. at 57 (first citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 254 (Mo. 2009) (en 
banc) (“[T]hese cases do not question the court’s subject matter or personal jurisdic-
tion and really go to the court’s authority to render a particular judgment in a particu-
lar case.” (citations omitted)). 
 125. See Flynn, 154 S.W.2d at 57. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 254.  
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which at the time did not conflict with Missouri’s constitution.
128
  It merely 
expressed a concept now embodied in Missouri’s law of civil procedure: fail-
ure to state a cause of action is jurisdictional because the petition does not 
assert a case or matter, depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
129
  
As Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 55.27(f) provides, failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted is not among the defenses that can be 
waived;
130
 obviously, this is because it is jurisdictional.  
In light of this Article’s focus on the application of J.C.W.’s analysis to 
administrative agencies, an interesting aside is the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri’s reading of Flynn just three years before J.C.W. in In re Marriage of 
Hendrix.
131
  In that case, the court approved Flynn’s conclusion that jurisdic-
tional competence properly applied in the “narrow circumstance[]” of a par-
ty’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
132
  
Notwithstanding previous courts’ use of jurisdictional competency to re-
fer to a requirement that a petitioner plead a cause of action, the J.C.W. court 
decided that the time for rejecting the concept had come.
133
  Misperceiving 
the doctrine as a third category of jurisdiction, the court concluded that the 
concept was inconsistent with Article V, section 14(a) of the Missouri Consti-
tution.
134
  “Because the authority of a court to render judgment in a particular 
case is, in actuality, the definition of subject matter jurisdiction,” the court 
reasoned, “there is no constitutional basis for this third jurisdictional concept 
for statutes that would bar litigants from relief.”
135
  In addition, J.C.W. decid-
ed the doctrine’s demise was necessary for pragmatic reasons.  The court 
feared that continued recognition would erode the circuit courts’ subject mat-
  
 128. At the time of the Flynn decision in 1941, the Missouri Constitution granted 
the circuit courts “exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases not otherwise pro-
vided for . . . .”  MO. CONST. art. V, § 14 (amended 1976) (emphasis added). 
 129. See State ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Dolan, 256 S.W.3d 77, 82 (Mo. 2008) 
(en banc) (“[T]he failure to state a cause of action is a jurisdictional defect because 
there is no subject matter on which the court can take jurisdiction.”). 
 130. This rule says:  
If a party makes a motion under this Rule 55.27 but omits therefrom any de-
fense or objection then available that this Rule 55.27 permits to be raised by 
motion, the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on the defense or 
objection so omitted, except a motion as provided in Rule 55.27(g)(2) on any 
of the grounds there stated.  
MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.27(f).  A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted is among the defenses listed in Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 
55.27(g)(2). 
 131. 183 S.W.3d 582 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). 
 132. Id. at 588 (citing State ex rel. Lambert v. Flynn, 154 S.W.2d 52, 57         
(Mo. 1941)). 
 133. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 254 (Mo. 2009)         
(en banc). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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ter jurisdiction and tempt litigants “to label every statutory restriction on 
claims for relief as a matter of jurisdictional competence.”
136
  Only the first 
two reasons – lack of a constitutional basis and potential erosion of circuit 
courts’ subject matter jurisdiction – appear to have true significance.
137
 
J.C.W. is correct, however, that after the 1976 amendment of Article V 
the constitution does not specifically provide for statutory restrictions.
138
  
And, in light of section 14(a)’s grant of plenary subject matter jurisdiction, 
the provision is open to an interpretation that statutory restrictions of the  
circuit courts’ jurisdictional power are inconsistent with the constitution.      
A cogent counterargument can be made, however, that the constitution’s 
grant of plenary power to the circuit courts is not inconsistent with all statuto-
ry restrictions.  Notably, the grant of plenary power arguably is not incon-
sistent with the General Assembly’s delegation of exclusive jurisdiction to an 
administrative agency.
139
 
The J.C.W. court’s second reason for refusing to recognize jurisdictional 
competence was its apprehension that the doctrine eroded the principle of 
separation of powers and “rob[bed] the concept of subject matter jurisdiction 
of the clarity that the constitution provides.”
140
  Again, this conclusion may 
be true for such statutory restrictions as section 452.455.4.  But, by implying 
that an exclusive administrative remedy should be treated like section 
452.455.4 – a lesson that the McCracken court gleaned from J.C.W – the de-
cision has the potential effect of eroding the separation of powers doctrine in 
the opposite direction.  It could diminish the General Assembly’s inherent, 
plenary power to grant unfettered, exclusive jurisdiction to administrative 
agencies.
141
  As separate, but complementary, arms of government, the circuit 
courts and administrative tribunals should function effectively side-by-side, 
each with their unique jurisdictions, rather than assume adjudicative baili-
  
 136. Id.  
 137. Undoubtedly, litigants can be expected to characterize any issue or matter in 
a way that works to their benefit – so long as it is within the confines of ethical prac-
tices, of course.  Indeed, one of the developments since McCracken has been that 
litigants and judges characterize any issue that before J.C.W. had been dubbed juris-
dictional as “authority” to proceed.  See infra Part III.E.  Surely the burden should fall 
on judges’, rather than litigants’, shoulders to discern and ward off mischaracteriza-
tions of the law.  
 138. See J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 252-54 (“Elevating statutory restrictions to mat-
ters of ‘jurisdictional competence’ erodes the constitutional boundary established by 
article V of the Missouri Constitution.”). 
 139. See infra Part V.B. for a discussion of such an interpretation. 
 140. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 254. 
 141. See Akin v. Dir. of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) 
(“Our constitution in article III, § 1, invests the General Assembly with broad, plena-
ry, legislative powers . . . .”). 
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wicks with no thought of the effects on the other tribunal.
142
  As will be dis-
cussed later in this Article, McCracken’s application of J.C.W.’s simple ap-
proach to exclusive administrative remedies opened up the potential for ero-
sion of the concept that the judiciary and administrative tribunals are to func-
tion as cooperative arms of effective government.
143
 
2.  Distinguishing Personal Jurisdiction from  
Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Apparently prompted by the intermediate appellate courts’ variously 
characterizing section 452.455.4 as personal jurisdiction and subject matter 
jurisdiction, J.C.W. discerned a need to distinguish between these two grand 
elements of jurisdiction.
144
  Each element, the court noted, answers separate 
questions concerning the adjudicative process.
145
  Personal jurisdiction an-
swers the question of an entity’s power over whom.
146
  Subject matter juris-
diction answers the question of power over what.
147
  
J.C.W. defined personal jurisdiction as the “power of a court to require a 
person to respond to a legal proceeding that may affect the person’s rights or 
interests.”
148
  It clarified that a lack of personal jurisdiction “means simply 
that the constitutional principle of due process bars [the court] from affecting 
the rights and interests of a particular person, whether such a ‘person’ be an 
individual or an entity such as a corporation.”
149
  On the other hand, J.C.W. 
defined subject matter jurisdiction as “the court’s authority to render a judg-
ment in a particular category of case.”
150
  Indeed, as commentators have ex-
plained, subject matter jurisdiction is “the competency of a court to hear and 
  
 142. See State Tax Comm’n v. Admin. Hearing Comm’n, 641 S.W.2d 69, 73-74 
(Mo. 1982) (en banc) (“The purpose of the doctrine of separation of powers . . . is to 
prevent the abuses that can flow from centralization of power.  While the autonomy of 
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches lies at the heart of our system of gov-
ernment  . . . .  Each branch constitutes only a part of a single government and must 
interact harmoniously with the other two.  The independence of the branches must be 
consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the Constitution 
in one indissoluable bond of union and amity . . . .  From a pragmatic standpoint it is 
obvious that some overlap of functions necessarily must occur.  The complexity of 
modern government demands the delegation of some administrative and decisional 
authority to executive agencies because of their particular areas of expertise.” (cita-
tions omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 143. See infra Parts IV.B, C.  
 144. See J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 252. 
 145. See id. at 253. 
 146. Id. at 252-53. 
 147. Id. at 253. 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. (emphasis added). 
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decide particular categories of cases”
151
 and refers to a court’s authority to 
adjudicate the type of controversy, or class of cases, sub judice.
152
  Professors 
Allen Ides and Christopher May explained, “‘Type’ refers to the nature of the 
controversy, e.g., civil claims in general, probate proceedings, marriage dis-
solution, etc.”
153
  But, J.C.W. also defined subject matter jurisdiction as “the 
authority of a court to render judgment in a particular case . . . .”
154
  Mis-
souri’s sister jurisdictions concur that subject matter jurisdiction refers both to 
the category of cases and to issues pertaining to the court’s authority to render 
judgment in a particular case.  For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
has defined subject matter jurisdiction as “a court’s authority to hear and de-
termine a particular class of actions and the particular questions presented to 
the court for its decision.”
155
 
Hence, subject matter jurisdiction, so defined, encompasses the domain 
of what Missouri courts identified before J.C.W. as the third element of juris-
diction: the “power to render the particular judgment in the particular 
case.”
156
  J.C.W. concluded, therefore, that any issue or statute not focused  
on a court’s power over the parties and that involves the adjudicative process 
in virtually any manner constitutes subject matter jurisdiction.
157
  Conse-
quently, the J.C.W. court determined that any statutory impediment to a  Mis-
souri court’s power to adjudicate a case or matter cannot, by definition,  be 
jurisdictional.
158
  As the previous definitions indicate, any such statute would 
constitute a limitation on subject matter jurisdiction in contravention  of the 
Missouri Constitution’s granting the circuit courts exclusive subject matter 
jurisdiction.  
J.C.W., however, did not distinguish among the various statutory re-
strictions.
159
  The court seemed to view a statute like section 452.455.4 and its 
bond requirement similar to a statute establishing an exclusive administrative 
remedy.  Of course, pursuant to its inherent legislative power, the General 
Assembly is still free to enact such statutes, but J.C.W.’s lesson was that Mis-
souri courts must treat such statutes as non-jurisdictional.  
  
 151. TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 6. 
 152. 1 ROBERT C. CASAD & WILLIAM B. RICHMAN, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL 
ACTIONS: TERRITORIAL BASIS AND PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON JURISDICTION OF STATE 
AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1-1 (3d ed. 1998).  
 153. ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND 
PROBLEMS 279 (2d ed. 2006).  
 154. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 254. 
 155. Giersdorf v. A & M Constr., Inc., 820 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Minn. 2012) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 156. See supra text accompanying note 113. 
 157. See J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 252-54. 
 158. See id. at 254. 
 159. See id. 
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3.  Effect of Treating Statutory Restrictions 
 as Non-Jurisdictional Rules 
Treating a statute as non-jurisdictional has significant practical effects 
on the adjudicatory process.  The most notable effect is that it moves the bur-
den of enforcing the rule from the court to the parties.  The courts have no 
obligation to see that a non-jurisdictional rule is enforced because these rules 
concern matters of personal privilege and are imposed primarily for the par-
ties’ benefit.  A party waives its rights to enforcement of a non-jurisdictional 
rule by failing to assert it at the proper time.
160
  
This was a key lesson that the McCracken court gleaned from J.C.W.  
The McCracken court perceived J.C.W.’s approach as requiring it to treat 
even a statute that completely abolished a cause of action as non-
jurisdictional.
161
  McCracken inferred from J.C.W. that a trial court should 
proceed with adjudicating the case, even if it recognized that the action impli-
cated a cause that no longer existed.
162
  
C.  The Circuit Courts’ Subject Matter Jurisdiction is Plenary 
The second point of J.C.W.’s jurisdiction lesson is that Article V,      
section 14(a) grants Missouri circuit courts plenary subject matter jurisdic-
tion.
163
  J.C.W.’s emphasis on section 14(a)’s “plenary terms”
164
 lent itself    
to the McCracken court’s conclusion that the circuit courts’ original jurisdic-
tion over “all cases and matters, civil and criminal,” is broad enough to    
include even administrative adjudications.
165
  Later, while addressing how    
to handle non-jurisdictional rules, the opinion treated alike all statutes impos-
ing impediments on a circuit court proceeding without regard for the nature of 
the impediment.
166
  
The J.C.W. court inferred that, if the subject matter jurisdiction of Mis-
souri circuit courts is all-encompassing, the circuit courts have authority to 
hear any case.
167
  Thus, the circuit courts’ subject matter jurisdiction includes 
cases and matters of whatever kind, even administrative adjudication.  Hence, 
  
 160. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 477 (Mo. 2009) 
(en banc). 
 161. See id. at 479. 
 162. See id. at 477-78. 
 163. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 253. 
 164. Id. 
 165. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 476-77 (quoting MO. CONST. art. V, § 14). 
 166. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 255 (“When a statute speaks in jurisdictional terms or 
can be read in such terms, it is proper to read it as merely setting [non-jurisdictional] 
limits on remedies or elements of claims for relief that courts may grant.”).  
 167. See J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 254. 
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a circuit court judge’s task of determining whether its court has subject matter 
jurisdiction in any given lawsuit is “simple.”
168
  J.C.W. explained: 
Applying [the jurisdictional basics set out in J.C.W.]
169
 makes simple 
the task of determining jurisdiction: The present case is a civil case.  
Therefore, the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction and, thus, 
has the authority to hear this dispute.  The circuit court also has the 
power to render a judgment that binds the parties, who both are resi-
dents of Missouri.  Therefore, it has personal jurisdiction.
170
 
D.  Distinguishing Jurisdictional and Non-Jurisdictional Fact-Finding 
A significant issue in J.C.W. was who sets the amount of the bond re-
quired by section 452.455.4: the circuit court or the Division of Child Support 
Enforcement, the relevant state administrative agency.
171
  The court analyzed 
the issue: 
If, as Mother claims, Father did in fact owe more than $10,000 in child 
support arrearages, the plain language of section 452.455.4 would 
prohibit him from filing a motion to modify.  The statute says that the 
bond shall be in the amount of past child support “owed as ascertained 
by the division of child support enforcement or reasonable legal fees 
of the custodial parent, whichever is greater, before the filing of the 
petition.” . . . Father cannot be barred from judicial relief by a factual 
determination made by the division of child support in the absence of 
an opportunity for judicial review of the issue.
172
 
The J.C.W. court resolved the issue by framing it as a matter of separation    
of powers.  “Article I, section 14 [of the Missouri Constitution],” the court 
reasoned, “provides that the ‘courts of justice shall be open to all.’            
This means that the key to the courthouse door cannot be in the hands of an 
enforcement agency.”
173
 
An alternative way of resolving the issue of who is to set bond, especial-
ly in light of J.C.W.’s emphasis on jurisdiction, is to understand the issue as a 
matter of jurisdiction.  The amount of the bond is a jurisdictional fact, and 
  
 168. Id. 
 169. J.C.W. actually said, “Applying this principle to the present case makes sim-
ple the task of determining jurisdiction[.]”  Id.  The principle discussed in the previ-
ous paragraph was jurisdictional competence.  Id.  The court obviously did not intend 
for “this principle” to refer to jurisdictional competence.  Apparently, the court was 
referring to its entire discussion of jurisdiction.  See id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. at 256-57. 
 172. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 256-57 (citation omitted). 
 173. Id. at 257. 
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jurisdictional facts – those determining whether or not an entity has the power 
to hear and determine a case
174
 – are always questions of law.
175
  Courts de-
cide questions of law.
176
  Thus, as a question of law, the circuit court and not 
the Division of Child Support Enforcement should have determined the 
amount of the bond.  
E.  J.C.W.’s Simple Approach Creates Confusion 
As appealing as J.C.W.’s simple approach is, it did not prove to be quite 
so simple in Missouri courts’ early attempts at application.  J.C.W.’s analysis 
caused confusion among Missouri judges as they struggled to understand 
J.C.W.’s scope.  Judges encountered difficulty determining whether J.C.W.’s 
approach truly applies to every restraint on the adjudicatory process, statutory 
or otherwise.  
A good example of this confusion involves the time constraints on filing 
motions for post-conviction remedies.
177
  Before J.C.W., Missouri courts 
declared it was obligatory to dismiss any motion filed beyond deadlines set 
by the Supreme Court’s rules because those deadlines were jurisdictional.
178
  
After J.C.W., the Supreme Court of Missouri continued to declare that courts 
were obligated to dismiss motions for missed deadlines, but it offered no ex-
planation for the basis of the dismissal,
179
 leaving Missouri’s intermediate 
appellate courts to struggle with the issue.  Confusion ensued.  
In Swofford v. State, the court acknowledged J.C.W.’s instruction con-
cerning jurisdiction and read the decision to require that a deadline set out in 
the Missouri Supreme Court rules was no longer a jurisdictional matter.
180
  
The Swofford court decided to use what it described as its inherent “power 
and duty to enforce Missouri Supreme Court rules” to dismiss a late-filed 
motion deadline even though the state’s attorney did not object until ap-
peal.
181
  The court reasoned that its inherent power authorized it to disregard 
“whether or not the state raised the issue [at the trial level] or on appeal be-
cause the state cannot, by failing to object, waive a movant’s noncompliance 
  
 174. Harold M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a 
Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1547-48 (2008). 
 175. Greene v. St. Louis Cnty., 327 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Mo. 1959) (“Unless the 
jurisdictional facts appear upon the record no jurisdiction is conferred and none can 
be exercised.”) (citing Whitely v. Platte County, 73 Mo. 30, 31 (1880)). 
 176. Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (“The quin-
tessential power of the judiciary is the power to make final determinations of ques-
tions of law.”). 
 177. See Snyder v. State, 334 S.W.3d 735, 737 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011). 
 178. Clark v. State, 261 S.W.3d 565, 569 & n.1 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008).  
 179. See Gehrke v. State, 280 S.W.3d 54, 57 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 180. 323 S.W.3d 60, 62-63 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010). 
 181. Id. at 63-64.  
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with the time constraints of the post-conviction relief rules.”
182
  The court 
apparently deemed J.C.W.’s lesson as primarily a labeling issue – that is, it 
could treat the deadline as a jurisdictional rule so long as it did not refer to the 
issue as jurisdiction. 
Struggling with the same issue, the court in State ex rel. Scroggins v. 
Kellogg
183
 took a similar position but used different analysis.  Although 
J.C.W. did not mention restrictions imposed by the Supreme Court’s rules, 
the Kellogg court read J.C.W. as applying to restrictions of all kinds, includ-
ing those set out in rules of procedure.
184
  Although the Kellogg court under-
stood J.C.W. to require that it treat the rule of procedure as non-jurisdictional, 
it still treated the rule as jurisdictional by dismissing a post-conviction motion 
only because it was filed late notwithstanding the lack of objection by the 
state.
185
  Its only explanation for the court dismissing the motion was that “a 
statute or rule . . . may still limit the court’s ability to grant a remedy.”
186
  
In Snyder v. State, the court addressed the same issue but disagreed with 
Swofford and Kellogg.
187
  The Snyder court viewed J.C.W. and McCracken as 
requiring circuit courts to treat the state’s failure to object to a missed dead-
line as a waiver of the issue.
188
  Although the deadline surely was not im-
posed for the benefit of the state, the Snyder court concluded that J.C.W. re-
quired it to treat the deadlines as a matter of personal privilege, subject to 
waiver by the state’s attorney at his or her discretion. 
As evidenced by these decisions, Missouri judges have responded to 
J.C.W. by treating all restrictions on their authority, whether imposed by stat-
ute or by rule, as involving merely a matter of labeling.  Judges adopted a 
practice of substituting the term “authority” for any ruling that they would 
have called an issue of jurisdiction before J.C.W. but still treating the issue as 
a matter of jurisdiction.
189
  They use “authority” to describe a court’s power 
  
 182. Id. at 63.  
 183. 311 S.W.3d 293 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010). 
 184. See id. at 296-97. 
 185. Id. at 298. 
 186. Id. at 297.  
 187. 334 S.W.3d 735, 738-39, 738 n.6 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011). 
 188. Id. at 738-39 (quoting McCracken’s declaration that “if a matter is not    
jurisdictional but rather is a procedural matter required by statute or rule or an affirm-
ative defense of the sort listed in Rule 55.08, then it generally may be waived if not 
raised timely.”). 
 189. The judges adopted the practice from the Supreme Court’s opinions.  In 
McCracken, the court noted that previous courts had “confused the concept of a   
circuit court’s jurisdiction . . . with the separate issue of the circuit court’s statutory or 
common law authority to grant relief in a particular case.”  McCracken v. Wal-Mart 
Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 477 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).  In State ex rel. Praxair, 
Inc. v. Missouri Public Service Commission, the court cited J.C.W. in declaring that a 
previous decision, State ex rel. AG Processing, Inc. v. Thompson, 100 S.W.3d 915 
(Mo. App. W.D. 2003), had improperly used “the term ‘jurisdiction’ [when] the more 
appropriate term would be authority.” 344 S.W.3d 178, 192 n.9 (Mo. 2011) (en banc). 
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to make a ruling, render a judgment, review a petition, or simply proceed with 
adjudication
190
 and continue on, using the same analysis it used before J.C.W.  
Hence, rather than clarifying and simplifying jurisdiction, as the Su-
preme Court of Missouri hoped, J.C.W. resulted in form over substance in 
Missouri courts.  Of more significance, J.C.W.’s simple approach to jurisdic-
tion, which failed to provide clear rules for distinguishing jurisdictional and 
non-jurisdictional rules, has created unnecessary confusion concerning the 
power of administrative agencies to exercise their exclusive jurisdiction.  As 
applied by McCracken, J.C.W. portends significant change in how courts 
should analyze statutes granting administrative agencies, such as the Division 
of Workers’ Compensation, exclusive jurisdiction. 
IV.  MCCRACKEN’S APPLICATION OF J.C.W. TO EXCLUSIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
A.  Workers’ Compensation Remedy is an Affirmative Defense 
Ten months after handing down J.C.W., the Supreme Court of Missouri 
applied J.C.W.’s jurisdictional lesson in McCracken, a case implicating 
workers’ compensation statutes.
191
  The McCracken court ruled that, although 
the circuit court found plaintiff’s case to be within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Division of Workers’ Compensation, the circuit court erred by dismiss-
ing the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction.
192
  The circuit court dismissed the 
lawsuit because it determined the plaintiff was the defendant’s statutory em-
ployee,
193
 and, according to sound precedent at the time, any claim filed 
against a plaintiff’s statutory employer was within the division’s exclusive 
jurisdiction.
194
  The McCracken Court held, however, that this precedent re-
  
 190. E.g., Mansheim v. Dir. of Revenue, 357 S.W.3d 273, 277 n.5 (Mo. App. E.D. 
2012) (“authority to review [a] petition”); Wright v. Bartimus, Frickleton, Robertson 
& Gorny, 364 S.W.3d 558, 565 n.6 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (“‘authority’ to render a 
particular judgment”).  
 191. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 475. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Id. at 474-75.  MO. REV. STAT. § 287.040.1 (Supp. 2012) states: 
Any person who has work done under contract on or about his premises which 
is an operation of the usual business which he there carries on shall be deemed 
an employer and shall be liable under this chapter to such contractor, his sub-
contractors, and their employees, when injured or killed on or about the prem-
ises of the employer while doing work which is in the usual course of his 
business. 
 194. Harris v. Westin Mgmt. Co. E., 230 S.W.3d 1, 2-3 (Mo. 2007) (en banc); 
Romero v. Kan. City Station Corp., 98 S.W.3d 129, 137 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003).  MO. 
REV. STAT. § 287.120.2 (Supp. 2012) says:  
The rights and remedies [granted by the Workers’ Compensation Act] to an 
employee shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his 
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sulted from “confused” analysis,
195
 and it summarily overruled the prior cas-
es.
196
  “To treat workers’ compensation defenses differently,” the court de-
clared, “would promote ‘continued confusion in the courts as to whether a 
court’s error[] in following a statute . . . [is] jurisdictional in nature.’”
197
  
The plaintiff in McCracken filed a negligence action against the operator 
of a Walmart store in Neosho.
198
  The plaintiff alleged that a Walmart em-
ployee negligently caused a delivery rack to fall on him as he delivered bread 
to the store.
199
  The plaintiff averred that his employer, Interstate Brands, 
settled his workers’ compensation claim against it.
200
  But, on the day trial 
was to begin, Walmart filed a motion to dismiss in which it asserted that the 
plaintiff was its statutory employee and, therefore, the division had exclusive 
jurisdiction over the matter as a workers’ compensation claim.
201
  After a 
hearing on the issue, the circuit court agreed with Walmart that the plaintiff 
was Walmart’s statutory employee and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint for 
lack of jurisdiction.
202
 
In reversing the circuit court’s dismissal, the McCracken court drew up-
on its understanding of J.C.W. to hold that the circuit court had jurisdiction 
regardless of what workers’ compensation statutes said.
203
  Merely because 
the plaintiff’s complaint averred a negligence action, the court concluded that 
“the [Workers’ Compensation] Act could not overrule the provision of Article 
V, section 14 giving circuit courts jurisdiction over personal injury claims.”
204
 
The McCracken court instructed that the circuit court should have ig-
nored the issue of whether the matter was a workers’ compensation claim 
because the issue did not implicate jurisdiction at all.
205
  It explained that the 
provision of workers’ compensation statutes for an exclusive administrative 
remedy constitutes an affirmative defense because these statutes are merely 
non-jurisdictional rules.
206
  Thus, the parties could choose to waive the right 
  
wife, her husband, parents, personal representatives, dependents, heirs or next 
kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury or death . . . . 
 195. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 477. 
 196. Id. at 479 (“To the extent that these . . . cases hold that the [Workers’ Com-
pensation] Act’s applicability is a matter of the trial court’s subject matter jurisdic-
tion, they are overruled.”). 
 197. Id. (citing J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 254 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc)) (alterations in original). 
 198. Id. at 475-76. 
 199. Id. at 475.  
 200. Id.  
 201. Id. at 476. 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. at 476-77. 
 204. Id. at 475, 479. 
 205. Id. at 475-76. 
 206. Id. at 478-79. 
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to have the Division of Workers’ Compensation adjudicate the case in favor 
of trying the matter in circuit court as a negligence action.
207
  
In actuality, the lawsuit proceeded in the circuit court much like the 
McCracken court envisioned that it should.
208
  Consistent with the McCrack-
en court’s charted course, the circuit court assumed until immediately before 
trial that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s negligence 
suit.
209
  The circuit court persisted in this assumption until the defendant, in a 
last-minute motion to dismiss, called the circuit court’s attention to its belief 
that the plaintiff was its statutory employee, making the matter a workers’ 
compensation case.
210
  The circuit court immediately convened a hearing, 
decided the defendant was correct – a decision the McCracken court ruled 
was wrong
211
 – and dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit on the grounds that the 
division, rather than the circuit court, had jurisdiction over the matter.
212
  The 
McCracken court said this was the point at which the circuit court’s handling 
of the case went awry.  
According to McCracken, the circuit court erred by allowing Walmart to 
raise its contention that the plaintiff was a statutory employee in a motion to 
dismiss because the matter should have been raised as an affirmative de-
fense.
213
  By taking up the issue in a motion to dismiss, McCracken reasoned, 
the circuit court necessarily treated the matter of the exclusivity of the work-
ers’ compensation remedy as a jurisdictional issue.
214
  McCracken was cor-
rect that the trial court did treat the issue as jurisdictional, but it obviously did 
so because the Supreme Court’s previous cases had declared the matter to be 
jurisdictional.
215
  McCracken rejected these cases as wrongly decided, stating 
that they were the results of “sloppy” analysis.
216
  McCracken explained that 
“the issue [of whether or not the plaintiff is a statutory employee] is not a 
  
 207. Id. at 479. 
 208. See id. at 478. 
 209. Id. at 476. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 481. 
 212. Id. at 476. 
 213. Id. at 477.  
 214. Id. at 479. 
 215. Just two years earlier, the Supreme Court of Missouri said:  
As noted in James v. Poppa, 85 S.W.3d 8, 9 (Mo. banc 2002), a motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is an appropriate means of rais-
ing the workers’ compensation law, chapter 287, as a defense to a common 
law tort action.  A court shall dismiss the action whenever it appears that the 
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.  As the term ‘appears’ suggests, the 
quantum of proof is not high; it must appear by the preponderance of the evi-
dence that the court is without jurisdiction.  
Harris v. Westin Mgmt. Co. E., 230 S.W.3d 1, 2-3 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (footnote 
omitted). 
 216. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 478. 
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jurisdictional one . . .”
217
 because it is not a question that affects the circuit 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction to decide his claim.”
218
   
The McCracken court acknowledged that Walmart’s not raising the is-
sue as an affirmative defense would have, under normal circumstances, re-
sulted in the court’s deeming the defense waived.
219
  But, because previous 
courts “erroneously [treated the workers’ compensation remedy] as a jurisdic-
tional one in the mid-1980s and thereafter,” the court accorded Walmart grace 
and considered the issue despite its untimely assertion.
220
 
B.  McCracken’s Potential Effect on  
Exclusive Administrative Law Remedies 
McCracken highlights a trap for the unwary defendant.  As a non-
jurisdictional affirmative defense, workers’ compensation – and presumably 
any exclusive administrative remedy – is an issue of personal privilege that    
a party can waive.
221
  If Walmart was correct that the plaintiff was its statuto-
ry employee, waiting until the day of trial to assert a workers’ compensation 
remedy thwarted the General Assembly mandate of an exclusive remedy.
222
  
Under McCracken’s analysis, the trial court should have deemed the      
workers’ compensation remedy waived and proceeded with the trial of        
the plaintiff’s tort claim without regard for whether the Division of Workers’ 
Compensation had exclusive authority over the claim under the workers’ 
compensation statutes.  
McCracken’s analysis thus jeopardized the exclusivity of the workers’ 
compensation remedy.  This jolting prospect prompted two commentators to 
ask whether the case was “the opening jab in a bout to knockout (or work 
around) the exclusive remedy bar established by the Missouri workers’ com-
pensation statute[.]”
223
  Indeed, without exclusivity, workers’ compensation 
simply cannot function as the legislature intended.
224
  McCracken opened the 
door to the possibility that an employee could evade the workers’ compensa-
  
 217. Id. at 475. 
 218. Id. at 479. 
 219. Id. at 479.  
 220. Id. at 475. 
 221. Id. 
 222. MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.27(a) requires that an affirmative defense be asserted in 
the responsive pleading if one is required.  The McCracken court excused Walmart’s 
tardiness “because prior cases had stated that this issue was jurisdictional . . . , [so] the 
matter will be treated as preserved in this case.”  298 S.W.3d at 475.  The court then 
ruled that the circuit court had erred in finding that the plaintiff was a statutory    
employee.  Id. 
 223. Guffey & Sturycz, supra note 78, at 206.  
 224. Loretta F. Samenga, Workers’ Compensation: The Exclusivity Doctrine, 41 
LAB. L.J. 13, 15 (1990) (Exclusivity “is and has been the heart and soul of workers’ 
compensation legislation since its enactment.”). 
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tion remedy simply by suing his or her employer in a negligence action.
225
  
As was evident in Goodrum v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., litigants do at times 
seek to evade workers’ compensation to avoid its perceived drawbacks.
226
 
While the General Assembly enacted workers’ compensation as a bene-
fit to employees, those benefits come with tradeoffs.
227
  The most notable 
downside to workers’ compensation for employees is the typically smaller 
recoveries than those awarded in civil tort actions.
228
  To compensate for 
lower recoveries, the General Assembly built into workers’ compensation 
advantages for employees, such as a “no-fault” approach under which em-
ployees are relieved of the burden of proving their employer’s liability.
229
  An 
employee can establish employer liability merely by showing that his or her 
injury arose out of an on-the-job accident.
230
  These advantages can be 
enough of an incentive for employer defendants to want to avoid a workers’ 
compensation remedy.  The McCracken court apparently recognized these 
incentives and admonished employees who might try to use tort actions to 
evade workers’ compensation: 
[The plaintiff does not have] an undefeatable right to have his claim 
determined in circuit court just because he chose to file it there in the 
first instance, without regard to whether he is Wal-Mart’s statutory 
employee or whether his claim is otherwise one that Missouri statutes 
commit to determination by the [Labor and Industrial Relations] 
Commission.  Rather, it means that this issue should be raised as an 
  
 225. See Guffey & Sturycz, supra note 78, at 208.  
 226. 824 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1992) (en banc); see discussion of Goodrum supra notes 
65-75 and accompanying text. 
 227. In Thomas v. City of Springfield, the court described the purpose of workers’ 
compensation statutes as 
to provide financial and medical benefits to the victims of 'work-connected” 
injuries and to their families – regardless of fault – and to allocate the financial 
burden to the most appropriate source, the employer, and, ultimately, the con-
sumer.”  This policy underlies Missouri’s own approach to adjudicating work-
ers’ compensation claims . . . .  
88 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002) (quoting Leslie A. Bradshaw, Annotation, 
Suicide as Compensable Under Workmen’s Compensation Act, 15 A.L.R.3d 616, 622 
(1967)).  Indeed, the driving force behind Missouri’s adoption of workers’ compensa-
tion was labor unions which pushed for it as a benefit for their members.  PATRICK J. 
PLATTER, I MO. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.4 (MoBar, 3d ed. 2004). 
 228. Samenga, supra note 224, at 15-16. 
 229. See Amanda Yoder, Note, Resurrection of a Dead Remedy: Bringing Com-
mon Law Negligence Back into Employment Law, 75 MO. L. REV. 1093, 1100 (2010). 
 230. See id.  
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affirmative defense to the circuit court’s statutory authority to proceed 
with resolving his claim.
231
 
This response treats the issue merely as a matter of trial procedure and strate-
gy and fails to appreciate the essential nature of the exclusive remedy to 
workers’ compensation.  
A litigant seeking to evade the workers’ compensation remedy can be 
defeated only by a defendant that asserts the workers’ compensation statutes 
properly and in a timely manner – unlike Walmart in McCracken.
232
  Indeed, 
a defendant may be quite willing, for strategic reasons, to have a workers’ 
compensation case tried in a civil court rather than by an administrative law 
judge.  After all, the General Assembly established workers’ compensation 
primarily for the benefit of employees.
233
 
C.  Potential for Dual, Conflicting Lines of Cases 
Not only does McCracken’s analysis threaten the exclusivity of the 
workers’ compensation remedy, but it also creates the potential for dual con-
tradictory lines of cases.
234
  This potential diversion raises, of course, the 
specter of forum shopping.
235
  These potential ill effects were avoided when 
the Division of Workers’ Compensation had exclusive jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate an employee’s claim for an on-the-job accident.
236
  
Dual lines of conflicting cases could undermine the policymaking of the 
Division of Workers’ Compensation.
237
  After McCracken, an appellate judge 
warned of the potential for such an undermining.
238
  In his dissenting opinion 
in State ex rel. KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Co. v. Cook, Judge 
James Smart admonished that the circuit court’s adjudication of a claim that, 
“on its face, purports to have arisen out of an employment relationship” be-
fore the division adjudicated it would undermine division policy by allowing 
“a civil jury the initial right to decide” causation, an issue previously deemed 
to be within the division’s exclusive jurisdiction.
239
  Judge Smart character-
ized such an arrangement – one seemingly adopted by the McCracken court – 
as “a ground-breaking change in the law.”
240
 
  
 231. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 477 (Mo. 2009) 
(en banc). 
 232. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.08. 
 233. See sources cited supra note 227. 
 234. See State ex rel. KCP&L Greater Mo. Operations Co. v. Cook, 353 S.W.3d 
14, 51 (Mo.  App.  W.D. 2011) (Smart, J., dissenting). 
 235. See id.  
 236. Id. 
 237. See id. at 50-51. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 51. 
 240. Id. 
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Such a result is groundbreaking because it jeopardizes the very reason 
for administrative agencies’ existence.
241
  As the Supreme Court of Missouri 
has recognized, expertise is agencies’ raison d’être.
242
  For example, briefly 
after Missouri’s first administrative agency, the Public Service Commission, 
came into existence in 1913, the Supreme Court noted the commission’s ex-
pert staff and observed that it had “at hand more expert machinery [for rate-
making] than any earthly Legislature possesses.”
243
  Without doubt, the 
commission has more ratemaking expertise than any circuit court.
244
  The 
theory underlying administrative decision-making, including its adjudicatory 
decisions, is that agencies’ streamlined, unencumbered procedures facilitate 
neutral, expert solutions to society’s complex problems more efficiently than 
what the legislative or judicial branches can deliver.
245
   
Moreover, statutes granting exclusive administrative remedies embody 
expressions of society’s values.
246
  Missourians were reluctant to join the 
national movement to substitute workers’ compensation remedies for com-
mon law tort actions asserting claims for on-the-job accidents.
247
  When they 
  
 241. See generally Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative       
Procedure and the Decline of the Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 476-77 (2003) (ex-
plaining the benefits of using administrative agencies to implement regulatory and 
benefit programs). 
 242. See, e.g., Killian v. J & J Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Mo. 1991) 
(en banc).   
 243. State ex rel. Rhodes v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 194 S.W. 287, 291-92 (Mo. 
1917) (en banc). The court further explained:  
The situation as to common carriers changes from year to year . . . .  A fixed, 
hard and fast rate made one year might be almost confiscatory next year . . . .  
No legislature has the time, nor is it equipped with the machinery necessary to 
investigate matters of ratemaking in any manner which will serve to prevent 
its enactment of laws fixing alleged “reasonable maximum rates” from being 
other than a mere guess.   
Id. at 291. 
 244. See id. at 295-96.  
 245. Levy & Shapiro, supra note 241, at 476-77. 
 246. See id. at 503-04.  
 247. Missourians accepted workers’ compensation only after labor forces pushed 
relentlessly for more than a decade for the reform.  PLATTER, supra note 227.  The 
General Assembly first considered workers’ compensation legislation in 1915, but 
supporters could not muster enough support to pass a law.  Id.  When on-the-job acci-
dents increased significantly toward the end of World War I, unions pushed harder for 
workers’ compensation, and the General Assembly passed a bill in 1919 after bitter 
debate.  Id.  The Governor signed it, but business interests mounted a referendum 
campaign that resulted in the law’s repeal by a narrow margin.  Id.  The General As-
sembly passed another workers’ compensation bill in 1923, which the Governor 
signed, but again opponents were able to get it repealed in a second referendum cam-
paign in which businessmen promised to work with legislators to formulate a better 
bill.  Id.  The General Assembly passed a compromise bill in 1925, which again was 
put to a popular vote.  Id.  With labor and business leaders endorsing it, voters ap-
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did, they inculcated their values and expectations into the workers’ compen-
sation statutes.
248
  The Supreme Court of Missouri’s failure to perceive and 
apply a jurisdictional rule such as section 287.120.2 frustrates operation of 
democratic ideals and agency policymaking. 
The judiciary’s failure to heed traditional jurisdictional boundaries di-
viding civil actions from administrative adjudications not only compromises 
the advantages of agency expertise, but it also thwarts uniformity of the law.  
Inconsistent application of the law results in injustice; outcomes thus become 
dependent on a litigator’s ability to have his case tried by one tribunal rather 
than another.
249
  
D.  Basis for Disputing McCracken’s Characterization of Section 
287.120.2 as a Non-Jurisdictional Rule 
McCracken’s characterization of section 287.120.2 as a non-
jurisdictional, affirmative defense is subject to dispute.  First, the court’s 
characterization relied heavily on early cases that recognized workers’ com-
pensation as an affirmative defense.
250
  McCracken failed to recognize that 
the statutes relied upon by the early decisions were significantly different 
than the statutes in effect in 2009.  Second, a cogent argument can be made 
that a statute like section 287.120.2, which abolished a civil cause of action 
and supplanted an administrative remedy for it, is not the same as the statute 
that was at issue in J.C.W.
251
 
1.  McCracken’s Misplaced Reliance on Early Workers’ 
Compensation Cases 
Key to the McCracken court’s conclusion that section 287.120.2 was a 
non-jurisdictional, affirmative defense was the court’s misperception of early 
workers’ compensation cases.
252
  The court noted that “Missouri courts . . . 
  
proved the measure during the November 1926 election.  Id.; see also Price V. 
Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers' Compensation in the 
United States, 1900-1930, 41 J.L. & Econ. 305, 320 n.A1 (1998).  
 248. See Derek W. Black, A Framework for the Next Civil Rights Act: What Tort 
Concepts Reveal About Goals, Results and Standards, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 259, 286-
87 (2008); Levy & Shapiro, supra note 241, at 504. 
 249. See State ex rel. KCP&L Greater Mo. Operations Co. v. Cook, 353 S.W.3d 
14, 51 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (Smart, J. dissenting) (explaining how such inconsist-
encies can develop).  
 250. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 478 (Mo. 2009) 
(en banc) (citing Warren v. Am. Car & Foundry Co., 38 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. 1931) (en 
banc); Kemper v. Gluck, 39 S.W.2d 330 (Mo. 1931) (en banc); Schneider v. Union 
Elec. Co., 805 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991)).  
 251. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 252. See McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 478-79. 
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required from the first cases addressing the issue in the early 1930s” that par-
ties claiming the exclusive workers’ compensation remedy must assert the 
remedy “as an affirmative defense under Rule 55.08 rather than by a motion 
to dismiss where, as here, the worker has chosen to proceed by filing a tort 
suit.”
253
  The court was correct.  The early workers’ compensation cases, one 
of the first being Kemper v. Gluck (on which the McCracken court relied 
heavily), did declare that “[w]here an action is at common law and invokes 
common-law liability only, an exception to such liability created by statute is 
not an element of the cause of action; it is a matter of defense.”
254
  
McCracken, however, failed to account for a significant difference be-
tween workers’ compensation laws in effect in 1931, when the Supreme 
Court of Missouri handed down Kemper, and those governing in 2009.  The 
most notable difference was that the 1931 statutes made workers’ compensa-
tion optional.
255
  They permitted employees and employers to elect “to reject 
[the Workers’ Compensation] act.”
256
  The 1931 statutes did not include a 
provision like section 287.120.2’s mandate that workers’ compensation be the 
exclusive remedy.
257
  After the General Assembly established workers’ com-
pensation in Missouri in 1925, it remained an elective remedy until 1974, 
when the legislature made it compulsory for all employers who had five or 
more employees.
258
  The General Assembly expanded workers’ compensation 
coverage again in 1990 to include all construction industry employers who 
had employees.
259
 
When the Supreme Court handed down Kemper, workers’ compensation 
had been a part of Missouri statutes for only a few years.  The plaintiff in 
Kemper sued her employer in tort for redress of injuries suffered while doing 
her job as a restaurant waitress, and she won an award.
260
  On appeal, the 
employer asserted for the first time that workers’ compensation was the plain-
tiff’s exclusive remedy.
261
  The Kemper court recognized that the predecessor 
to the Division of Workers’ Compensation, the Compensation Commission, 
had jurisdiction over such claims in appropriate cases, but it did not deem the 
issue to be jurisdictional in that particular case because the employer did not 
  
 253. Id. at 475. 
 254. 39 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Mo. 1931) (en banc). 
 255. Id. at 331; see also PLATTER, supra note 227.   
 256. Kemper, 39 S.W.2d at 331. 
 257. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120.2 (2012) (amended 2013) provides: 
The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee shall exclude all other 
rights and remedies of the employee, his wife, her husband, parents, personal 
representatives, dependents, heirs or next kin, at common law or otherwise, on 
account of such injury or death, except such rights and remedies as are not 
provided for by this chapter.  
 258. PLATTER, supra note 227. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Kemper, 39 S.W.2d at 331.  
 261. Id. 
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raise workers’ compensation in its pleadings.
262
  The Kemper court put the 
burden on the employer to raise workers’ compensation as an affirmative 
defense for the obvious reason that workers’ compensation was not the exclu-
sive, mandatory remedy at that time.
263
 
In 1931, employees and employers could opt out of workers’ compensa-
tion.
264
  As a result, the appropriate remedy depended on the election made by 
the plaintiff or her employer to opt in or out.  The election made the issue a 
matter of pleading, as the Kemper court explained in a quotation emphasized 
by McCracken:
265
 “[t]he burden is upon the party claiming the applicability 
of the [Workers’ Compensation] act to bring himself under it . . . . [and] if he 
would make it a defense, he must plead and prove himself within its 
terms.”
266
  As an elective program, workers’ compensation was an exception 
to common law liability.
267
  An employee and employer could opt for a tort 
remedy rather than workers’ compensation.  Hence, it was a matter of an  
affirmative defense.
268
  
All of that changed in 1974 when the General Assembly abolished 
common law liability – or tort actions for on-the-job accidents – and         
substituted compulsory workers’ compensation.
269
  Thus, the McCracken 
court’s reliance on Kemper’s assertion that workers’ compensation is a    non-
jurisdictional affirmative defense, while true when Kemper was decided, was 
misplaced.  
2.  Workers’ Compensation Supplanted Tort Actions 
for Workplace Injuries 
When the General Assembly changed workers’ compensation to a man-
datory, exclusive remedy in 1974, the statute became a jurisdictional         
rule.  The statute removed the choice not to participate in workers’ compensa-
tion.
270
  By making workers’ compensation the only remedy for workplace 
  
 262. Id. at 331-34. 
 263. See id. at 333-34.  
 264. Id. at 331-34.  This option obviously was one of the compromises that facili-
tated passage of workers’ compensation in Missouri after several failed attempts.  See 
PLATTER, supra note 227, at §§1.3-1.4. 
 265. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 478 (Mo. 2009) 
(en banc).  
 266. Kemper, 39 S.W.2d at 333. 
 267. PLATTER, supra note 227, at § 1.3, 
 268. See Kemper, 39 S.W.2d at 333-34. 
 269. PLATTER, supra note 227.  Those more recent cases to which McCracken 
cited as holding that workers’ compensation was an affirmative defense relied on the 
Kemper line and also failed to perceive the effect of the law change.  See McCracken, 
298 S.W.3d at 479.  
 270. See MO. REV. STAT. § 287.030 (2000) (defining the term “employer” for 
purposes of the Workers’ Compensation statutes); § 287.120.1 (Supp. 2012) (“Every 
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injuries,
 271
 the General Assembly did not deprive the circuit courts of juris-
diction to adjudicate claims based on workplace injury or death.  Instead,      
it eliminated a civil cause of action for on-the-job accidents and substituted 
workers’ compensation.  As the Supreme Court of Missouri recognized,   
even after McCracken, “The General Assembly . . . has enacted remedies  
that displace damages actions altogether, in workers compensation           
proceedings, which substitute administrative proceedings for common law 
damages actions.”
272
  It was a change the Supreme Court declared to            
be “unobjectionable.”
273
 
Therefore, workers’ compensation arguably does not affect a circuit 
court’s original jurisdiction over civil claims for on-the-job accidents.        
The McCracken court correctly concluded that the issue of whether the case 
was a workers’ compensation matter “is not a question that affects the circuit 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction,”
274
 but the reason was also not, as the 
court surmised, that workers’ compensation is “an exception to the normal 
rule that tort cases are determined by the circuit court.”
275
  Rather, the issue 
was that the General Assembly, pursuant to its legislative prerogative,     
abolished any tort action for a claim arising out of an accidental on-the-job 
injury or death.  The circuit courts’ plenary subject matter jurisdiction      
includes only “cases and matters, civil and criminal.”
276
  No civil action exists 
in Missouri whereby an employee can sue his or her employer for a claim 
arising out of an accidental on-the-job injury or death because the General 
Assembly abolished it. 
An exclusive workers’ compensation remedy, therefore, does not usurp 
the circuit courts’ subject matter jurisdiction; it cannot by definition.  The 
circuit courts have no authority or power claim to adjudicate a case or matter 
that does not exist.  The Missouri Constitution grants circuit courts original 
jurisdiction only over cases and matters that are cognizable.  And, in Mis-
souri, no cause of action exists outside of workers’ compensation in which a 
  
employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be liable, irrespective of negli-
gence, to furnish compensation under the provisions of this chapter for personal injury 
or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of the employ-
ee's employment.”). 
 271. See § 287.120.2 (“The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee 
shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his wife, her husband, 
parents, personal representatives, dependents, heirs or next kin, at common law or 
otherwise, on account of such injury or death, except such rights and remedies as are 
not provided for by this chapter.”).  
 272. Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 311 S.W.3d 752, 779 (Mo. 2010)            
(en banc). 
 273. Id. 
 274. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 479. 
 275. Id. 
 276. MO. CONST. art. V, § 14. 
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plaintiff can assert a claim against his or her employer for injuries suffered in 
an on-the-job accident. 
As the United States Supreme Court explained long ago, jurisdiction is a 
tribunal’s power to adjudicate the merits of a case and to “dispose of it as 
justice may require.”
277
  The Supreme Court of Missouri has agreed: “Subject 
matter jurisdiction . . . exists only when the tribunal has the right to determine 
the controversy . . . or grant the relief prayed.”
278
  Because the circuit courts 
have no power to adjudicate claims fitting within the parameters of section 
287.120.2, they have no subject matter jurisdiction.
279
  Hence, the determina-
tion of whether a case falls within section 287.120.2 is a jurisdictional issue. 
V.  ALTERNATIVES TO MCCRACKEN’S ANALYSIS 
Although the McCracken court’s analysis focused primarily on protect-
ing the circuit courts’ plenary subject matter jurisdiction, the court was mind-
ful that its decision would affect the exclusivity of workers’ compensation as 
a remedy for on-the-job injuries.
280
  The court did not show a desire to bring 
about the demise of the exclusive workers’ compensation remedy, but it ap-
parently perceived that, to protect the circuit courts’ jurisdiction, its only op-
tion was to strip jurisdictional status from workers’ compensation and any 
other exclusive administrative remedy.  If the court recognized that it had 
other options, it did not indicate it.  The court had at least four alternative 
approaches to the one applied in McCracken.  Each has the advantage of pro-
tecting the circuit courts’ jurisdiction while still according jurisdictional sta-
tus to the exclusive workers’ compensation remedy. 
A.  Alternative One: Properly Distinguish Between  
Jurisdictional and Non-Jurisdictional Facts 
In a distinction seemingly overlooked by the J.C.W. court,
281
 jurisdic-
tional facts, in contrast to non-jurisdictional facts, are always questions         
of law
282
 for courts to decide.
283
  The distinction between jurisdictional facts 
  
 277. The Resolute, 168 U.S. 437, 439 (1897). 
 278. State Tax Comm’n v. Admin. Hearing Comm’n, 641 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Mo. 
1982) (en banc) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 279. See MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120.2 (Supp. 2012). 
 280. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 477 (The circuit courts having subject matter 
jurisdiction “does not mean that Mr. McCracken has an undefeatable right to have his 
claim determined in circuit court . . . .”). 
 281. See supra Part III.D. 
 282. Greene v. St. Louis Cnty., 327 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Mo. 1959) (“Unless the 
jurisdictional facts appear upon the record no jurisdiction is conferred and none can 
be exercised.”) (citing Whitely v. Platte Cnty., 73 Mo. 30, 31 (1880)). 
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and non-jurisdictional facts becomes particularly significant when a civil 
action implicates statutes mandating an exclusive administrative remedy.     
In such cases, because administrative agencies are strictly creatures of stat-
ute,
284
 a court’s determination of jurisdictional facts necessarily requires  
statutory construction,
285
 and statutory construction is an issue of law.
286
  
Thus, the circuit court, not an administrative agency, must determine jurisdic-
tional facts.
287
  Obviously an administrative agency’s determination of         
its own jurisdiction would be tantamount to allowing an agency to “add to its 
own powers and create rights and duties beyond what the Legislature       
provided or intended.”
288
  
On the other hand, substantive facts are not matters of law but questions 
of fact.
289
  In a case involving an administrative remedy, the administrative 
agency is to decide such facts.
290
  These facts define the merits of a case – 
that is, they concern what conduct, or lack thereof, subjects the actors          
(or those who fail to act) to liability and who can seek redress for the       
specified conduct.
291
  
The substantive merits of a Missouri workers’ compensation case are set 
out in section 287.120.1.  This statute says, “Every employer subject to the 
provisions of this chapter [who] shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to 
furnish compensation under the provisions of this chapter for personal injury 
or death [conduct] of the employee [who] by accident arising out of and in the 
course of the employee’s employment [conduct] . . . .”
292
  A claimant bears 
  
 283. Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (“The quin-
tessential power of the judiciary is the power to make final determinations of ques-
tions of law.”). 
 284. State ex rel. Praxair, Inc. v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 344 S.W.3d 178, 192 
(Mo. 2011) (en banc) (“The [Public Service Commission] is an administrative body 
created by statute and has only such powers as are expressly conferred by statute and 
reasonably incidental thereto.”); Union Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 591 S.W.2d 
134, 137 (Mo. App. W.D. 1979).  
 285. See State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 
598-99 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 286. City of St. Joseph v. Vill. of Country Club, 163 S.W.3d 905, 907 (Mo. 2005) 
(en banc). 
 287. Harris v. Westin Mgmt. Co. E., 230 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) 
(“[J]urisdiction remains in the trial court unless it appears by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of workers’ compensa-
tion law. . . .  [T]he court must examine the facts presented and find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the issue contested is one within the [Workers’ Compensa-
tion Division’s] expertise.”). 
 288. Soars v. Soars-Lovelace, Inc., 142 S.W.2d 866, 871 (Mo. 1940). 
 289. Wasserman, supra note 174, at 1548. 
 290. Spencer v. Zobrist, 323 S.W.3d 391, 399 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).  
 291. Wasserman, supra note 174, at 1548. 
 292. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120 (Supp. 2012). 
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the burden to present facts that establish the elements.
293
  Because these ele-
ments govern who can make a claim and for what, their underlying factual 
issues are matters of substantive merit.
294
  Because section 287.120.1 sets out 
factual issues of substantive merits, only the Division of Workers’ Compen-
sation can determine these facts, including whether an injury resulted from an 
on-the-job accident. 
Contrast these provisions with the provisions in section 287.120.2.  This 
statute declares that workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy for an 
employee making a claim that satisfies the elements set out in section 
287.120.1.
295
  By invoking the exclusive remedy, section 287.120.2 sets out a 
jurisdictional rule.  J.C.W. warned of being misled by statutes that spoke “in 
jurisdictional terms or [could] be read in such terms . . . ,” but it was referring 
to statutes that set “statutory limits on remedies or elements of claims for 
relief that courts may grant.”
296
  The workers’ compensation statutes are truly 
jurisdictional.  They mandate that workers’ compensation “rights and reme-
dies . . . shall exclude all other rights and remedies . . . .”
297
  This provision, 
especially coupled with another subsection of section 287.120, which releases 
an employer “from all other liability whatsoever,”
298
 is clearly jurisdictional.  
These statutory restrictions are not like the bond requirement at issue in 
J.C.W.  Rather, these provisions abolish all causes of action except for work-
ers’ compensation as adjudicated by the division.  
Thus, the McCracken court correctly declared that the circuit court   was 
the proper entity to decide whether the plaintiff was the defendant’s statutory 
employee, but it was not for the reason asserted by McCracken.  The 
McCracken court concluded that the circuit court should decide the issue 
because it was “not a jurisdictional one . . . .”
299
  In actuality, the circuit court 
should have decided the jurisdictional facts (whether the plaintiff was         
the defendant’s statutory employee) because the issue was jurisdictional.       
If the plaintiff was not the defendant’s statutory employee, the division would 
not have authority to adjudicate the matter as a workers’ compensation claim.  
  
 293. Russell v. Sw. Grease & Oil Co., 509 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Mo. App. K.C.D. 
1974) overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 
220 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).  
 294. Wasserman, supra note 174, at 1548. 
 295. § 287.120.2 (“The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee shall 
exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his wife, her husband, parents, 
personal representatives, dependents, heirs or next kin, at common law or otherwise, 
on account of such injury or death, except such rights and remedies as are not provid-
ed for by this chapter.”).  
 296. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 255 (Mo. 2009)         
(en banc).  
 297. § 287.120.2. 
 298. § 287.120.1. 
 299. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Mo. 2009) 
(en banc).  
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Because the issue was to be determined by the jurisdictional facts, the      
circuit court, not the division, was the proper entity to decide the matter as a 
question of law.  
Because J.C.W. and McCracken did not make such distinctions between 
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional facts and explain their significance, Mis-
souri courts have failed to understand how to apply these important, funda-
mental concepts when analyzing jurisdictional issues.  For example, in Cook 
the court endeavored to apply McCracken’s analysis to determine who had 
jurisdiction – the circuit court or the Division of Workers’ Compensation – in 
a case in which the plaintiff complained of “an occupational disease” rather 
than an “accident.”
300
  The plaintiff sued his former employer for negligence 
for allegedly exposing him to asbestos, which caused him to develop meso-
thelioma.
301
  The employer argued for summary judgment on the grounds that 
the plaintiff’s claims constituted a workers’ compensation claim.
302
  
Rather than distinguishing jurisdictional facts from non-jurisdictional 
facts, the Cook court interpreted the workers’ compensation statutes to decide 
whether the plaintiff’s claim fit within their scope.
303
  In a 9-2 split, the ma-
jority ruled that because occupational diseases are outside the scope of work-
ers’ compensation statutes, which provide a remedy only for on-the-job acci-
dents, the circuit court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.
304
  
The Cook court incorrectly treated the factual issue – whether an occu-
pational disease constitutes an accidental injury – as jurisdictional.  This issue 
is not jurisdictional because it pertains to the substantive merits of the case.  
Hence, the facts giving rise to the issue are non-jurisdictional facts to be   
determined by the division.
305
  By allowing the circuit court to involve itself 
in the matter, the Cook court usurped the division’s authority.  More         
importantly, the intrusion created the opportunity for the circuit court to con-
tradict the division’s prior decisions concerning what constituted an accident, 
thereby creating conflicting lines of cases and interfering with the division’s 
ability to set policy.
306
 
Unlike the Cook court, the circuit court in McCracken correctly per-
ceived the nature of the factual question it considered – whether the plaintiff 
  
 300. State ex rel. KCP & L Greater Mo. Operations Co. v. Cook, 353 S.W.3d 14, 
16 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011). 
 301. Id.  
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. at 18. 
 304. Id. at 19-20. 
 305. That the Cook majority would make the very error decried in McCracken – 
mischaracterizing rules of substantive merits as jurisdictional rules – is ironic in light 
of the majority’s painstaking and laborious attempt to follow J.C.W.’s and McCrack-
en’s analysis. 
 306. Cook, 353 S.W.3d at 51 (Smart, J., dissenting). 
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was the defendant’s statutory employee – to be jurisdictional.
307
  After decid-
ing that the plaintiff was, in fact, the defendant’s statutory employee, the cir-
cuit court correctly understood that the matter was within the division’s ex-
clusive jurisdiction.
308
  Because the workers’ compensation statutes abolish 
all causes of action for on-the-job injuries, the circuit court arguably lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction.
309
  Dismissal was its only option.  On the other 
hand, if the circuit court had reached the decision that the McCracken court 
did – that the plaintiff was not the defendant’s statutory employee – the cir-
cuit court would have properly retained jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court’s 
determination that the plaintiff was not the defendant’s statutory employee 
made the matter a valid, cognizable negligence action not supplanted by 
workers’ compensation law.
 310
  
Such an analytical approach protects the circuit courts’ plenary subject 
matter jurisdiction while avoiding the jeopardy that McCracken posed to  
administrative adjudication.  By distinguishing between jurisdictional and 
non-jurisdictional facts, the circuit court has a sound basis for dismissing 
invalid tort actions over which it has no subject matter jurisdiction, such as 
workers’ compensation matters, enabling the appropriate entity to exercise its 
jurisdiction.
311
  Moreover, the circuit court has the authority to dismiss the 
matter sua sponte.
312
 
B.  Alternative Two: Interpret Section 14(c) as  
Not Including Administrative Adjudications 
Another alternative to the all-or-nothing approach of McCracken is to 
understand that the terms “cases” and “matters” used in Article V, section 
14(a) of the Missouri Constitution do not necessarily refer to administrative 
adjudications.  Missouri case law considering the nature of administrative 
adjudication is not abundant, but the few cases that address the issue conclude 
that administrative cases do not constitute traditional civil actions.  Arguably, 
therefore, they do not fit within the terms “cases” or “matters” as used by 
section 14(a).  
In Bridges v. State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts, the court 
held that administrative adjudications are not traditional civil cases.
313
  Bridg-
es concerned an administrative action against a physician whose license to 
practice medicine was revoked by a state administrative board on the ground 
  
 307. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 474-75 (Mo. 2009) 
(en banc).  
 308. The McCracken court reversed this decision.  Id. at 479. 
 309. See supra Part IV.D.2. 
 310. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 481.  
 311. Green v. St. Louis Cnty., 327 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Mo. 1959). 
 312. Cook v. Cook, 97 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002).  
 313. 419 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Mo. App. 1967). 
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that he performed illegal abortions.
314
  At issue was the physician’s assertion 
that the board wrongfully denied his request for a continuance of a hearing to 
consider revocation of his license.
315
  He made the request pursuant to a stat-
ute, which required continuance of a civil case if the attorney involved in the 
case was a legislator who was attending a legislative session when the civil 
case was scheduled.
316
  The Bridges court rejected his contention, partly be-
cause the statute applied only to civil or criminal cases, and the board’s hear-
ing, as an administrative proceeding, was neither.
317
 
In reaching this conclusion, the Bridges court relied on the Supreme 
Court of Missouri’s decision in State v. Harold.
318
  In that case, the court 
declared a juvenile proceeding was neither a criminal nor a civil matter.
319
  
The court reasoned that it could not be a civil case – described as “a private 
right or the redress or prevention of a private wrong” – because juvenile pro-
ceedings are “administrative police regulations.”
320
  The court explained: 
The State is not a party to the proceedings in the sense that parties 
seek the protection of private rights or prevention of private wrongs in 
civil cases.  Juvenile cases may partake something of the nature of civ-
il cases and also of criminal cases.  However, under the basic distinc-
tions between civil and criminal cases recognized in this state for 
many years, we conclude that the instant proceeding does not classify 
as a “civil case” within the meaning of the term as used in the consti-
tutional appellate jurisdictional sense.
321
 
The Bridges court also relied on State ex rel. Ball v. State Board of 
Health, in which the Supreme Court of Missouri considered another physi-
cian licensing matter.
322
  The State Board of Health revoked a physician’s 
license to practice medicine and surgery for “unlawfully solicit[ing] patrons 
  
 314. Id. at 280. 
 315. Id. at 281. 
 316. Id.  The statute said:  
In all civil cases or in criminal cases pending in any court of this state at any 
time when the general assembly is in session, it shall be a sufficient cause for 
a continuance if it shall appear to the court, by affidavit, that . . . any attor-
ney . . . of such party is a member of either house of the general assembly, and 
in actual attendance on the session of the same, and that the attendance of 
such . . . attorney . . . is necessary to a fair and proper trial or other proceeding 
in such suit . . . .  
MO. REV. STAT. § 510.120 (1959) (emphasis added). 
 317. Bridges, 419 S.W.2d at 281. 
 318. 271 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. 1954). 
 319. Id. at 529. 
 320. Id. at 530. 
 321. Id. (emphasis added). 
 322. 26 S.W.2d 773 (Mo. 1930). 
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by agents.”
323
  In response to the defrocked physician’s complaints that the 
board had not followed adequate civil procedures, the court observed that   
the proceeding before the board was not a lawsuit; therefore, the board was 
not obligated to heed the technical rules of a judicial trial.
324
  The court    
further explained: 
The state board of health is not a court . . . .  It can issue no writ.  It 
can try no case – render no judgment.  It is merely a governmental 
agency, exercising ministerial functions.  It may investigate and satis-
fy itself from such sources of information as may be attainable as to 
the truth or falsity of charges of misconduct against one holding one of 
its certificates, but its investigation does not take on the character of a 
judicial trial.  To guard and protect the health and welfare of its people 
the state must have its ministerial agents or officers and [e]ntrust them 
with power . . . .
325
 
Moreover, the Missouri Constitution deems administrative adjudications 
sufficiently distinctive that it makes special provision for subject matter juris-
diction for judicial review of the adjudications.  The constitution mandates 
that, when no other provision of law sets the jurisdiction for judicial review, 
the Supreme Court shall set it by rule.  The constitution states: 
Unless otherwise provided by law, administrative decisions, findings, 
rules and orders . . . shall be reviewed in such manner and by such 
court as the supreme court by rule shall direct and the court so desig-
nated shall, in addition to its other jurisdiction, have jurisdiction to 
hear and determine any such review proceeding.
326
 
Arguably, this provision would be unnecessary if section 14(a)’s reference   
to “all cases and matters” included judicial review of administrative         
adjudication. 
Thus, the McCracken court had a sound basis for interpreting “cases” 
and “matters” in section 14(a) as excluding administrative adjudications.  
Such an interpretation would permit recognition of the exclusivity of work-
ers’ compensation as a jurisdictional issue while still protecting the circuit 
courts’ plenary subject matter jurisdiction. 
  
 323. Id. at 774. 
 324. Id. at 777. 
 325. Id. at 777 (emphasis added) (internal alterations omitted) (quoting State ex 
rel. Goodier v. McAnnally, 93 S.W. 928, 929-30 (Mo. 1906) (en banc)). 
 326. MO. CONST. art. V, § 18. 
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C.  Alternative Three: Deem Workers’ Compensation Claims 
Masquerading as Tort Actions Non-Justiciable 
Even if the Supreme Court of Missouri rejects the premise underlying 
the previous two alternatives – that determination of an exclusive administra-
tive remedy is a jurisdictional issue or administrative adjudications do not fit 
within section 14(a)’s reference to “cases” and “matters” – it has another 
means for preserving administrative agencies’ exclusive jurisdiction without 
jeopardizing the circuit courts’ plenary subject matter jurisdiction.  It could 
employ the doctrine of justiciability.  Not all cases over which a circuit court 
has subject matter jurisdiction are appropriate for judicial action – only 
claims that are justiciable.  
Justiciability is a doctrine, closely related to jurisdiction, which devel-
oped as a means for ascertaining when a court’s exercise of jurisdiction         
is appropriate.  The principles of justiciability are largely prudential in nature; 
the judiciary tempers its exercise of power for the benefit of the whole, and 
for the sake of good government.
327
  The Supreme Court of Missouri recog-
nizes that a significant component of justiciability is that a judicial action     
be “appropriate for judicial determination.”
328
  Missouri courts also explain 
that a question is justiciable only if a case is “ripe” for the judiciary’s deter-
mination.
329
  The Supreme Court held that a trial court should defer to an 
administrative agency’s having jurisdiction in a matter by dismissing the  
lawsuit pending before the court “until after [the administrative] tribunal has 
rendered its decision.”
330
  These principles give a circuit court means for  
refusing to consider a matter that it recognizes – sua sponte or otherwise – as 
a cause of action invoking the jurisdiction of an administrative agency.  And, 
as J.C.W. put it, the circuit court can do so without “getting all jurisdictional 
about it.”
331
  
Indeed, in the case of a tort claim arising out of an on-the-job accident, 
the circuit courts would have prudential, or policy-based, reasons for assert-
ing that the claim is not justiciable.  By declaring that workers’ compensation 
cases masquerading as tort actions are non-justiciable, the courts would facili-
  
 327. CHARLES WRIGHT, ARTHUR MILLER & EDWARD COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS, § 3529 (3d ed. 2008); see 
State Tax Comm’n v. Admin. Hearing Comm’n, 641 S.W.2d 69, 73-74 (Mo. 1982) 
(en banc); Annbar Assoc. v. W Side Redevelopment Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635, 645 
(Mo. 1965) (en banc). 
 328. Cnty. Court of Wash. Cnty. v. Murphy, 658 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Mo. 1983) (en 
banc); Jacobs v. Leggett, 295 S.W.2d 825, 834 (Mo. 1956) (en banc). 
 329. Mo. Alliance for Retired Ams. v. Dept. of Labor & Indus. Relations, 277 
S.W.3d 670, 678 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) (plurality opinion); Mo. Health Care Ass’n v. 
Att’y Gen. of Mo., 953 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Mo. 1997) (en banc). 
 330. Killian v. J & J Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Mo. 1991) (en banc). 
 331. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 251 (Mo. 2009)         
(en banc). 
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tate operations of democratic ideals and policies underlying the administra-
tive agencies, notably expertise and specialized knowledge.  Equally im-
portant, the courts would avoid development of dual, contradictory lines of 
cases that would instigate forum shopping and undermine agency policy.  
The judiciary’s robust application of the doctrine of justiciability in tort 
actions implicating exclusive administrative remedies would go a long way in 
avoiding the potential pitfalls emerging from McCracken.  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri could protect the breadth of the circuit courts’ subject mat-
ter jurisdiction while preserving operation of administrative adjudication in 
the manner envisioned by the General Assembly.  
D.  Alternative Four: Reinstate the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction 
Perhaps the most viable option is one closely related to the concept of 
justiciability,
332
 which – since McCracken – has already been employed by 
the Missouri Court of Appeals.  It is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, de-
veloped by the federal courts more than a century ago as a means for preserv-
ing effective operation of federal administrative agencies in cases in which 
the federal courts and agencies have concurrent jurisdiction.
333
  
The Supreme Court of Missouri sets 1932 as the year Missouri adopted 
a form of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
334
  As the court describes   
Missouri’s version of the doctrine, it applies to issues involving “administra-
tive expertise, technical factual situations and regulatory systems in which 
uniformity of administration is essential.”
335
  The court instructed trial courts 
to dismiss actions meeting these criteria in deference to the jurisdiction         
of administrative agencies.
336
  Although Missouri courts applying the       
doctrine typically emphasize the need for expertise,
337
 clearly the need to 
  
 332. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 327, at § 3531.6. 
 333. Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440-41 (1907). 
 334. Lamar v. Ford Motor Co., 409 S.W.2d 100, 106-07 (Mo. 1966) (en banc) 
(“The doctrine has been widely applied by the federal courts and has been accepted 
by the state courts . . . .  The appellate courts of this state have had occasion to apply 
the doctrine principally in matters involving the Public Service Commission Act.  In 
State ex inf. Shartel ex rel. City of Sikeston v. Missouri Utilities Co., . . . 53 S.W.2d 
394, 401 [(Mo. 1932)] . . . , the court suggested that the question of public necessity 
for the continuation of electrical service was ‘a matter peculiarly within the jurisdic-
tion of the Public Service Commission,’ and, therefore, was not for consideration in 
an action to oust utility.”). 
 335. Id. at 107. 
 336. See id.  
 337. E.g., Harris v. Westin Mgmt. Co. E., 230 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) 
(“The determination of the existence of an employer/employee relationship is not a 
question requiring agency expertise.”). 
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maintain uniformity in the administrative agencies’ adjudications is also a 
significant component.
338
 
Using the primary jurisdiction doctrine to dismiss tort actions that were 
in actuality workers’ compensation claims became so common that courts 
dropped reference to primary jurisdiction and spoke only of jurisdiction in 
general terms.
339
  What the McCracken court attributed to erroneous and 
sloppy analysis
340
 were more likely decisions applying the primary jurisdic-
tion doctrine without so specifying.  This appears to be the case in the one 
decision cited by McCracken.
341
 
In Cooper v. Chrysler Group, LLC, the court employed the doctrine in 
its review of a lawsuit in which the plaintiff sought recovery for injuries suf-
fered in an apparent on-the-job slip and fall accident.
342
  The circuit court 
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that 
plaintiff’s exclusive remedy was workers’ compensation.
343
  The Cooper 
court applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to reverse the circuit court’s 
judgment and remand with instructions that the trial court stay the plaintiff’s 
lawsuit until the Division of Workers’ Compensation determined “whether 
there was an ‘accidental injury’ as defined by the Workers’ Compensation 
Law.”
344
  The key to the Cooper court’s mandate was that the circuit court 
was directed not to dismiss the action on remand.
345
  Instead, it was to put the 
circuit court proceedings on hold until the division had a full opportunity to 
exercise its adjudicatory authority.
346
 
Three months earlier, two Missouri appellate judges called attention to 
the doctrine in separate dissenting opinions in Cook.
347
  Weighing in on 
whether the circuit court or the Division of Workers’ Compensation should 
determine whether a plaintiff’s tort claim is within the exclusive purview of 
the workers’ compensation statutes,
348
 Judge James Welsh argued that, even 
after McCracken, primary jurisdiction still operates when workers’ compen-
sation statutes are implicated: 
  
 338. Lamar, 409 S.W.2d at 107. 
 339. E.g., State ex rel. Taylor v. Wallace, 73 S.W.3d 620, 621, 623 (Mo. 2002) 
(en banc). 
 340. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 475, 478 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc). 
 341. Id. at 478 (citing Wallace, 73 S.W.3d at 621, 623).  
 342. 361 S.W.3d 60, 61-62 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). 
 343. Id. at 61. 
 344. Id. at 61-62. 
 345. See id. at 67. 
 346. See id.  
 347. State ex rel. KCP&L Greater Mo. Operations Co. v. Cook, 353 S.W.3d 14, 
44, 46 (Welsh, J., and Smart, J., dissenting in separate opinions). 
 348. Id. at 16. 
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The circuit court does not have the option of retaining the case, pro-
ceeding to adjudicate [a non-jurisdictional factual issue] and the negli-
gence issue, and then entering judgment accordingly.  While both the 
[division] and the court may have concurrent subject matter jurisdic-
tion of the dispute, only one forum is the proper initial forum under 
these circumstances.  The case must be dismissed so that it can be pro-
cessed in the [division] because the [division] is the only proper initial 
forum for the matter in this procedural setting.
349
 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge James Smart offered this description of      
the doctrine: 
The concept . . . is grounded partially in practicality and partially in 
the concept of separation of powers.  It permits a “workable allocation 
of business” between the courts and the agencies established by the 
legislature . . . .  It applies where a claim that could (originally) have 
been addressed in a court has, under a regulatory scheme, been placed 
under the special competence of an administrative body.
350
 
Indeed, in Missouri’s post-McCracken era, this common law doctrine 
seems to offer the best prospect for maintaining a peaceful coexistence be-
tween the judicial and executive branches of Missouri government.  The 
United States Supreme Court endorsed it as “key” to achieving “consistent 
and coherent policy” between courts and agencies.
351
  Another federal court 
suggested that an excellent way to integrate an agency into the judiciary’s 
decision-making is to give the agency “the first word” on issues within the 
agency’s jurisdiction.
352
 
Because the doctrine is, as Judge Smart indicated, grounded in pruden-
tial considerations, Missouri courts are free to use it to carve out the best ap-
proach for achieving effective adjudication for a litigant.  In an approach tak-
en by the Cooper court, the courts certainly can stay their proceedings to give 
an administrative agency whose jurisdiction has been implicated an oppor-
tunity to adjudicate issues within the agency’s exclusive purview.  The circuit 
court would retain jurisdiction over the case while it awaits action by the 
agency.  The agency should not feel obligated to address an issue and can 
decline to act on a matter.  As had been the courts’ custom prior to McCrack-
en, a court can dismiss the entire lawsuit when it concludes that the matter is 
within an agency’s jurisdiction.  It typically reaches this decision after con-
  
 349. Id. at 43-44 (Welsh, J., dissenting).  
 350. Id. at 50 (Smart, J., dissenting) (quoting Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Modern Air 
Transp., Inc., 179 F.2d 622, 625 (2d Cir. 1950)). 
 351. Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 
400 U.S. 62, 68 (1970). 
 352. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 532 F.2d 412, 417 (5th 
Cir. 1976). 
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ducting an evidentiary hearing, as the trial court did in McCracken, to gather 
the jurisdictional facts.  
E.  Getting the Last Say Under Judicial Review 
Under primary jurisdiction or the other alternatives to the all-or-nothing 
analysis of McCracken, the courts have assurance that any administrative law 
matter it turns away will return to the judiciary for review after the agency 
enters its final decision and the matter is ripe for review.
353
  Thus, although 
the administrative tribunal has the first say, the judiciary has the last say in its 
review of the agency’s decision pursuant to its constitutional authority set out 
in Article V, section 18.
354
 
Therefore, in the primary jurisdiction doctrine or the other alternatives, 
the judiciary has available a flexible, effective means to achieve its central 
goal of protecting its plenary subject matter jurisdiction.  At the same time, 
the judiciary achieves a workable allocation of business between it and the 
administrative agencies, with an aim of promoting good government. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
According to the Supreme Court of Missouri’s understanding, two fac-
tors “bring down to earth and clarify the meaning of . . . ‘jurisdiction.’”
355
  
The first factor is that Missouri’s constitution grants circuit courts subject 
matter jurisdiction “over all cases and matters, civil and criminal.”
356
  The 
second factor is that the General Assembly is powerless under the constitu-
tion to diminish this all-encompassing jurisdictional power.
357
  The Supreme 
Court understands these factors to mean that no statute can restrict the circuit 
courts’ jurisdictional power and, if the statute claims to restrict the circuit 
  
 353. MO. CONST. art. V, § 18. 
 354. This provision says,  
All final decisions, findings, rules and orders on any administrative officer or 
body existing under the constitution or by law, which are judicial or quasi-
judicial and affect private rights, shall be subject to direct review by the courts 
as provided by law; and such review shall include the determination whether 
the same are authorized by law, and in cases in which a hearing is required by 
law, whether the same are supported by competent and substantial evidence 
upon the whole record.  
MO. CONST. art. V, § 18. 
 355. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 251 (Mo. 2009)         
(en banc).  
 356. MO. CONST. art. V, § 14(a). 
 357. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 254-55. 
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courts’ exercise of its power in any way, the statute is necessarily non-
jurisdictional and can be enforced, if at all, by the parties.
358
  
In formulating this “simple” approach to jurisdiction,
359
 the J.C.W. court 
locked its focus on the term “all” in the constitution’s grant of jurisdiction 
over “all cases and matters.”
360
  The court concluded that “all” means that a 
circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over every cause of action – even 
one abolished by the General Assembly – so long as the case purports to be 
“a civil case.”
361
  
Pursuant to its inherent legislative authority, the General Assembly abol-
ished common law tort claims for on-the-job accidents and substituted the 
workers’ compensation remedy.
362
  To be lawful, this legislative prerogative 
must satisfy the constitution’s requirements for separation of powers and its 
guarantee of a right for every legal wrong.
363
  The General Assembly’s aboli-
tion of such tort actions did not offend the constitution.  By substituting 
workers’ compensation for the tort action, the General Assembly provided a 
means for redressing on-the-job injuries.  And, by giving the Division of 
Workers’ Compensation only quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative authority, 
the legislature did not cause the division to unduly intrude into the circuit 
courts’ domain.
364
  Hence, the General Assembly did not violate separation of 
powers in substituting workers’ compensation for common law tort claims for 
on-the-job accidents.  
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Missouri seemed to perceive in 
McCracken that the recognition of workers’ compensation as an exclusive 
remedy intrudes into the circuit courts’ domain.  The only way this could be 
the case is if the language “all cases and matters” includes workers’ compen-
sation claims.  In other words, a conclusion that the circuit court in McCrack-
en had subject matter jurisdiction is proper only if the circuit court had con-
current jurisdiction with the Division of Workers’ Compensation.  Conclud-
ing that circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the division is clearly 
contrary to separation of powers. 
The circuit courts’ concurrent jurisdiction means that the General As-
sembly would be powerless to abolish a cause of action in Missouri.  Not-
withstanding the General Assembly’s abolition of tort claims for on-the-job 
accidents, the circuit courts still have jurisdiction over these claims by virtue 
of the courts’ jurisdiction over all cases, including workers’ compensation 
claims.  However, this is a dubious proposition.  As the Supreme Court ob-
served previously, “Article V [of the Constitution], the Judicial Article, is 
  
 358. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Mo. 2009) 
(en banc). 
 359. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 254. 
 360. Id. at 253-54.  
 361. Id. at 254. 
 362. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120 (Supp. 2012). 
 363. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 255. 
 364. Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Mo. 1993) (en banc). 
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devoted to governing the courts and judges, and we do not read the [1976] 
amendment [granting the circuit courts plenary jurisdiction] as a constraint 
upon the previously established power of the administrative agencies.”
365
 
Furthermore, deeming the circuit courts to have concurrent jurisdiction 
has the effect of centralizing adjudicative power in the judiciary, thereby  
nullifying the General Assembly’s authority to ever grant jurisdiction exclu-
sively to an administrative agency.
366
  It renders the General Assembly    
powerless to create an administrative agency that can operate without the 
circuit courts’ improper intrusion on agency policy and expertise.  As          
the Supreme Court has long recognized, “‘[A] careful study of the whole 
Constitution will . . . demonstrate that it was not the purpose to make a total 
separation of [legislative, executive, and judicial] powers. . . .  Each branch 
constitutes only a part of a single government and must interact harmoniously 
with the other two.”
367
 
Under the McCracken court’s perception of jurisdiction, harmonious in-
teraction between Missouri’s circuit courts and administrative tribunals is 
seriously threatened.  The court’s insistence that the circuit courts have juris-
diction and can adjudicate claims that are not even causes of action in Mis-
souri (claims arising out of on-the-job accidents) enables the judiciary to run 
roughshod over the General Assembly’s inherent power to abolish causes of 
action and to substitute an exclusive administrative remedy.  
The Supreme Court of Missouri acted with the understandable aim of 
protecting the circuit courts’ plenary jurisdiction.  What the court seemingly 
failed to appreciate, however, was that it could achieve this worthy goal with-
out trampling on the authority of the other branches of government.  Several 
sound alternatives outlined in this Article are available to the court and would 
simultaneously preserve the jurisdiction of the circuit courts and the state’s 
administrative tribunals.  For the sake of sound government and effective 
operation of the state’s administrative agencies – presumably not mutually 
exclusive concepts – Missouri’s courts must rethink their analysis of adminis-
trative agency jurisdiction. 
 
  
 365. Goodrum v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 824 S.W.2d 6, 12 (Mo. 1992)        
(en banc). 
 366. Killian v. J & J Installers, 802 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Mo. 1991) (en banc) (citing 
Hannah v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Mo. 1982) (en banc)). 
 367. State Tax Comm’n v. Admin. Hearing Comm’n, 641 S.W.2d 69, 74 (Mo. 
1982) (en banc) (quoting Rhodes v. Bell, 130 S.W. 465, 468 (Mo. 1910)). 
